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The Case Against Saddam
Hussein-The Case For World
Order
by Andrew M. Warner*

The following Article is an excerpt from a paper written in the Fall of
1990. The author submitted the paper in December 1990 as partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Laws program at the University of Virginia. The opinions and conclusions expressed are those of the
individual author and do not necessarily represent the United States
Army or other governmental agency.
The United Nations' Charter gives the Security Council enforcement
authority for breaches of world peace. To be meaningful, rights must have
remedies, and the Security Council should now pursue remedies to enforce the rights provided in the Charter. The bipolar politics that have
precluded effective sanctions for the last forty years have now subsided,
and the world stands at a precipice anticipating new action. This Article
advocates the United Nations Security Council use the current ",Crisis in
the Gulf" to establish a "Grievous Offender Tribunal" to try individuals
* Graduate student, University of Virginia School of Law. Major, United States Army
Corps. United States Military Academy (B.S., 1977); West Virginia University (J.D., 1982);
TJAGSA (LL.M., 1987); University of Virginia (LL.M., 1991). Member, State Bar of West
Virginia.
I owe a debt to the following people, each of whom have given me ideas, materials, or
assistance through classroom instruction or general discussion about this topic: Professors
Calvin Woodard, Richard Lillich, and A.E. Dick Howard from the University of Virginia
School of Law, Shabtai Rosenne and Abdel Massadeh, visiting scholars at the University of
Virginia School of Law, and LTC Wayne Elliott, Chief of International Law at The Judge
Advocate General's School. Various people at the Pentagon and Department of State have
also helped. I am particularly indebted to Professor John Norton Moore, University of Virginia School of Law, for his ideas, ,criticism and advice. Many ideas for this Article (including the subject itself) came from Professor Moore through his instruction, extra curricular
lectures, personal discussions, and advice as thesis advisor throughout the Fall 1990
semester.
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for violations of international law. Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait presents the Security Council with a paradigm case on
which to initiate such a Tribunal.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such
crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.'
The world of today is vastly different than the world of just a year ago.
The dismantling of the Berlin Wall served both as a literal and figurative
symbol of a new world order. Literally, the Wall's destruction united East
and West Germany where previously the world's two greatest armies
stood facing each other. Figuratively, it symbolized the dismantling of a
united Warsaw Pact and the control Moscow enjoyed over many countries. Democratic movements, open markets, and people seeking self-determination came forward. For perhaps the first time, many of the world's
people have realistic opportunities to enjoy basic freedoms, to be protected by fundamental human rights, and to live by the "rule of law." S
The fluid nature of the world's politics presents both opportunities for,
and dangers to, world order. Various analytical models suggest that following the "rule of law" is the most effective means of reducing war. This
Article uses two models, the practical McDougal-Lasswell 3 and the theoLouis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 362 (2d ed. 1987).
2. The phrase "rule of law" was coined by A.V. Dicey in the late 1800s. He used the

1.

phrase to mean the absolute supremacy of the regular (common) law, and equality before
the law while being administered by ordinary courts (officials were not excluded). The
phrase today includes the "legitimacy" notion that Dicey's meaning incorporated by referring to the common law-that is, law must arise from the people and be administered by
regularly constituted courts. See, e.g., Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe,
29 Int'l Legal Materials 1307 (1990) [hereinafter Copenhagen Document] (the rule of law
entails "a formal legality which assures regularity and consistency in the achievement and
enforcement of democratic order" and "justice based on the recognition and full acceptance
of the supreme value of the human personality and guaranteed by institutions providing a
framework for its fullest expression").

3. See

MYREs

S. McDouGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW

AND MINIMUM WORLD PUB-

(1961). I considered the first model, the McDougal-Lasswell system, extensively.
Though the McDougal-Lasswell approach did not serve decisively in drawing conclusions for
this Article, its comprehensive nature provided numerous tools and analytical concepts that
insured a thoroughness in the approach. The model forced the user to consider thoroughly
all possible factors that could play upon the decision maker. The strength of the model was
its "nitty gritty," making one dig into every crevice of the actual situation (past, present,
and future), before recommending a course of action based on the findings.
LIC ORDER
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retical Bull model. 4 Using the analytical tools the two models provide, the
author concludes that the "rule of law," if followed, will add significantly
to world order.'
Using analytical tools provided by the practical McDougal-Lasswell
model,6 this Article examines the past trends, the present situation and
key players in the Gulf Crisis and projects future trends. Then, using the
theoretical approach, the validity of using "law" to add to world order is
examined. Specifically, the practicality of establishing a Grievous Offender Tribunal, and the effect such a Tribunal would have in establishing "a new world order" through the rule of law, are discussed.
The analysis produces a logical progression in the development of the
international law of conflict management: have the Security Council place
personal responsibility on grievous offenders as the offenses occur, and
hold them criminally liable for their actions. The practical ramifications
4. HEDLEY BULL, ANARCHICAL SOCIETY (1977). The second model came from Hedley
Bull's ANARCHICAL SOCIETY. Without the "nuts and bolts" approach of McDougal-Lasswell,
Bull's model examines the "Nature of Order" without placing value on order, or making
order a goal or objective. Though Bull concludes the present "state system" is an effective
international system, his model does provide the deontological support for the ultimate conclusions drawn in this Article. (Perhaps if he were to write today he would conclude differently). In short, Bull's model shows order exists, and that rules assist in the maintenance of
order. By coupling the realities that the McDougal-Lasswell model provides with the subtlety of Bull's conclusions, one may recognize the value to world order of a Grievous Offender Tribunal consistent with the rule of law. See H. BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY Xii
(1977).
5. To place this Article's recommendations in context, an approach from the practical
model is employed. That is, the perspective of the author must be made clear. Though this
Article delves into numerous facts and is built upon real world situations, the author acknowledges severe limitations upon a fact pattern that is unfolding as the paper is being
written. The author is not privileged to secret communiques, high level diplomatic discussions, military plans or other information obtainable on a "need to know" basis. Hence, as
practical as the author wanted this paper to" be, in reality the paper must be viewed as
theoretical, advocating a position from an observer's-not an advisor's or decision
maker's-perspective.
6. The McDougal-Lasswell model provides a framework for problem solving, with the
following relevant intellectual tasks: Clarification of goals, description of past trends, an
analysis of conditions, projection of future trends, and evaluation of policy alternatives.
Each of these sections contain various factors for consideration. The overall process may be
viewed as a pie that may be sliced to provide systematic contextual study. Three analyses
(value, phase, and functional) contain numerous factors within each "slice", whose consideration results in a thorough dissection of a problem. See generally McDoUGAL, supra note 3.
7. A "new world order" has become the phrase used by leaders, diplomats, and reporters
to describe a world subject to the rule of law, administered and enforced by the United
Nations as its Charter originally intended, and where basic freedoms and fundamental
(human) rights are shared by all peoples of the earth. See, e.g., President George Bush,
Address at United Nations General Assembly (Oct. 1, 1990) in 26 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF
PRES. Doc. 1496, 1499 (1990).
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of such a move are explored in this Article in detail. The outcome is that
the initiation of a Grievous Offender Tribunal would not "just yield any
order," but order that leads to a particular result-an "arrangement of
social life such that it promotes certain goals or values."6 This is what the
people of the world desire, strive for, and expect. By providing such a
system, law will be used to reduce the potential for war.
II.

ANALYSIS OF THE PRESENT SITUATION

[T]he dominant challenge today to us as lawyers is not merely to establish some legal order, to make law prevail over naked force, but rather
to establish a public order of freedom, a public order in which all the
basic goal values of human dignity may be sought in security and with
abundance.'

Thus, the theme is set: promote a public order of freedom and human
dignity, keeping in mind the two goals of who or what should be the decision maker, and upon what type of issues should the decision maker act.
The conditions in the Gulf must be closely examined to determine who
within the United Nations organization is the proper decision maker, as
well as the scope of issues upon which this decision maker should act.
On August 2, 1990, Iraq, under the leadership of Saddam Hussein, invaded Kuwait. In five hours Hussein overran and took control of Kuwait. 10 In the months since the invasion, numerous courses of action were
taken, with many more contemplated, to resolve the hostilities. It is quite
possible that before this Article is presented, military or some other action may drastically alter the current status quo. Yet, regardless of the
outcome of the Gulf Crisis, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait provides a dramatic case for United Nations development of a personal law enforcement
sanction.
The on-going Gulf Crisis involves a mixture of individuals, states, and
international organizations. To thoroughly understand the Crisis, one
must understand the various people, religions, states, and organizations of
the area, each of which is influenced by centuries of tradition. This Article's recommendations, while at times contradictory to common perceptions, are made in consideration of what has happened in the past, and
with a view toward the future.
This Article will first discuss the Middle East situation in general. It
will then discuss the recent history of Iraq and explore the life of Saddam
8. BULL, supra note 4, at 4.
9. Myres S. McDougal, Jurisprudencefor a Free Society, 1 G. L. Rav. 16 (1966).
10. See Events in the PersianGulf Debate FeaturingIraqi Ambassador Mohammed AlMashat and Professor John Norton Moore (C-SPAN television broadcast, Oct. 5, 1990)
[hereinafter Debate].
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Hussein in detail. This Article will then examine the United Nations,
looking at both the General Assembly and the Security Council. Towards
the end, this Article will discuss the community of states led by the
United States in opposition to Iraq. In conclusion, this Article addresses
the proper role of law in the process of holding people personally accountable for their war crimes.
III.

THE MIDDLE EAST

[W]hen leaders are pessimistic about the long-term future of their regimes and at the same time have high confidence in the strength and
ability of their armed forces, then all that they know and all that they
fear will conspire to induce them to use their military power while it still
retains its presumed superiority. Only thus can today's strength be exploited to improve the prospects for a future which seems unfavorable.
To convert a transitory military advantage into a permanent gain of security for the regime, there must be some profitable war in prospect.
Profitable wars were rare even before the nuclear age, but once the urgency to act before it is too late is strongly felt, men will easily persuade
themselves of the high likelihood of victory, of its small cost, and of its
great benefits."
Though written about the Soviet Union, Luttwak's comment could easily have referred to the past several decades in Iraq, Iran, Libya, Israel,
Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and many other countries throughout the Middle
East. The absence of an adequate. balance of power in the region or sufficient deterrent regional agreements makes the area ripe for conflict. The
situation has led to war repeatedly in the past and is likely to do so again.
The Arab-Israeli Wars of 1967 and 1973, the Iran-Iraq War between
1980 and 1988, the Israeli pre-emptive strike on the Iraqi nuclear plant in
1980, the on-going conflict between Libya and Chad, and the continual
factional fighting in Lebanon all resulted from leaders who convinced
themselves that their strength could be exploited through military action,
and the benefits of such action would outweigh any retaliatory response.
Certainly, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was undertaken based on such
assumptions.
Islam, the dominant ideology of the region, has controlled the lives of
most of the people of the region for centuries. Usually thought of as a
religion by Westerners, Islam is much more than the practice and customs of a religion; it is a political doctrine endowed with a central authority."' Based on the belief that the state should be used as an instrument
for achieving doctrinal objectives, original Muslims (and fundamentalists
11.

EDWARD N. LUTTWAK, THE GRAND STRATEGY OF THE SOVIET UNION

12. M.

KHADDURI, THE ISLAMIC LAW OF NATIONS

10 (1966).

40 (1983).
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today) believed it was both their individual and collective holy duty to
conquer the world in the name of Islam. Not only was force acceptable to
accomplish this goal, world public order was to be based on divine legisla13
tion accomplished by Jihad, or holy war.
The law of war was only meant to be temporary, based on the assump1
tion the Islamic state was "capable'of absorbing the whole of mankind." 4
Islamic language reflected such assumptions, thus causing the world surrounding the Islamic state not under its rule to be known collectively as
the "territory of war."1 6 "It was the duty of Muslim rulers to bring this
'territory' under Islamic sovereignty whenever the strength was theirs to
do so."16 Given this historic perspective, events in the Persian Gulf today
become more understandable, and considerably more frightening.
IV. IRAQ

In many ways, present day Iraq and Saddam Hussein are one and the
same. Were it not for the rise of Islamic fundamentalism throughout Iraq,
with its desire for a strong central authority, someone such as Hussein
could not have risen to and kept power. Once in power, Hussein introduced the governing Ba'ath Party, which appealed to Arabs everywhere
because of its efforts to rebuild a strong Arab Nation. 7 Iraq sits firmly in
the grasp of a man willing to fan the emotional flames of religious and
nationalistic passion' to keep power. The mixture of religious and political
ideologies that revel in heroism and aim at destroying nonmembers invites a ruthless dictator.
Understanding Iraq's recent history is important to understanding the
religious, political, and cultural zeal in Iraq, particularly its hatred of
Western powers. Prior to World War I, the Middle East was part of the
Ottoman Empire, under Turkish rule. Because the Empire treated Arabs
13. Id. at xi. Khadduri states that: "Jihad is the Islamic bellum justum and may be
regarded as the very basis of Islam's relationships with other nations". But he goes on to
say, Jihad is generally used to refer to the individual and collective obligation of Muslims to
conquer infidels through the use of force; a holy war waged with the help of God, and for
God's benefit. But see A-Khatib, lecture on Jihad, University of Virginia School of Law,
March 7, 1991. AI-Khatib explained Jihad has numerous meanings: a way of life, a total
commitment, the taking care of the poor and needy, the rule of law, international law, and
Holy War are a few meanings of Jihad. In illustrating the vast differences, Al-Khatib explained that Jihad can be accomplished by four means: heart, tongue, hands, and sword.
Anything humans do by those four means that furthers the aims of Islam is Jihad.
14. Id. at 5. Once achieved, the raison d'etre of the law of war, would pass out of
existence.
15. Id. at 12.
16. Id. (emphasis added).
17. Staff of House Republican Research Comm. Rep., 102d Cong. 1st Sess., Task Force
on Terriorism & Unconventional Warfare (Comm. Print 1990) [hereinafter TASK FolCz].
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as second class citizens, there existed among them a strong desire to create a sovereign "Arab Nation." Hussein Ibn Ali (referred to as "Hussein
the Great" among the Arabs) led the struggle to create an "Arab Nation."
With the outbreak of World War I, Great Britain and France sought his
assistance to defeat the Turks."8
Great Britain and France struck a deal with the Arab leader. In exchange for his assistance, Hussein the Great was to get control of the
"Arab Nation" should the West be victorious. When the war ended and
time came to fulfill the promise, Great Britian and France had different
opinions than did Hussein the Great as to what lands and people the
"Arab Nation" entailed. From Hussein the Great's perspective, Britain
and France offered him only part of the Arab lands. Additionally, Britain
and France placed the intolerable condition that Jews be allowed to administer their own land into the arrangement. Hussein the Great was terribly hurt. and offended by this treatment from the West.'
Hussein the Great rejected the offer on the principle that it was not his
land to negotiate away, resulting in his banishment to Cyprus. Britain
and France then made their offer to the sons of Hussein the Great. Realizing that some land was better than none, the sons accepted the offer
and the "lines in the sand" were drawn. The deal created the modern day
states of Syria, Jordan and Iraq. However, the divisions were deeply resented by most Arabs. Faisal, the son in charge of Syria, was removed
from power within six months. Faisal then moved to Iraq where he was
soon made King Faisal. His collaboration with the British, however, never
appealed to Arab Nationalists. Thus began a long struggle in Iraq, as well
as other newly created Arab states pitting one Arab faction against another for power.
Yet, the conflicts in the region were not limited to Arab against Arab.
During the 1930s, Grand Mufti of Jerusalem Hajj Amin al-Hussaini tried
to forge German-Arab cooperation against the British and the Jews.2 In
1941 the Rashid Ali al-Kailani, with German assistance, led a violent
coup against the British. Hajj Amin described the coup as a Jihad and a
religious "pan-Arab struggle" against "the greatest enemy of Islam."'
The British suppressed the rebellion by force, and purged the Iraqi Army
of the rebellious soldiers.
Then, in 1948 the Arabs failed to defeat Israel, and the Iraqis who participated in the war against Israel experienced further humiliation and
18. Hussein the Great is the grandfather of King Hussein of Jordan. Interviews with
Abdel Massadeh, Jordanian, University of Virginia Law School, Charlottesville, VA (Sept.Dec. 1990).
19. Id.
20. See TASK FORCE, supra note 17, at 2.
21. Id. at 2.
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shame. Many Arabs, "burning with rage," blamed Western imperialists
for the Arab defeat-"' Arab extremists feeding off this rage sought to revive a pan-Arab nation. They asserted that such a nation would revel in
Arab glory, and become the world power they felt an Arab nation deserved to be.
Arab nationalism rose to a fervid pitch in 1956. In Egypt, Gamal Abdel
Nasser claimed "victory" after the Suez crisis, and proclaimed a policy
"to establish an Arab superpower from the Persian Gulf to the Ocean.""
Nasser's goal of an Arab superpower blended easily with the Ba'ath ideology-revive old pan-Arab glory through progressive revolutionary
methods.
On July 14, 1958, Abd-al-karim Qassim led an extremely bloody military coup in Iraq and established an antimonarchical regime."4 Ten days
later, one of the Ba'ath party founders, Michel 'Aflaq, urged Qassim to
join Egypt and Syria under the rule of Nasser in the United Arab Republic. Qassim refused 'Aflaq's suggestion, and 'Aflaq began urging the Ba'ath
Party to conduct revolutionary tactics against Qassim. Being mostly well
educated, upper middle class, the Ba'ath party members called on "hired
guns" to carry out the revolutionary violence 'Aflaq and other party leaders proposed. Saddam Hussein (no relation to Hussein the Great) answered the call.2
Though-Qassim tolerated the Ba'ath Party, his continued rift with Nasser made the Ba'athist militants determined to get rid of him. On October 7, 1959, Saddam Hussein led an assassination attempt on Qassim, but
the attempt failed.2 Saddam Hussein fled the country.2 7 In February of
1963, the Ba'athists and other radicals succeeded in overthrowing the
Qassim regime. The Ba'ath Party installed Abd-al-Salam 'Arrif as President. Though 'Arrif was supposed to be a compromise candidate between
the Ba'athists and the other radicals, the months following his takeover
were filled with bloody purges and fighting for power among the inner
groups. In November 1963, 'Arrif overthrew the radical Ba'athist elite,
and installed a nationalist, General Hassan al-Baqr' as his VicePresident.2s
22. Id. at 2-3.
23. Id. at 3.
24. Id. at 3-4. Qassim had been one of the soldiers who had fought against the Israelis.
25. Id. at 4.
26. Id. Iraqi legend, perhaps at the initiation of Hussein, maintains that Hussein was
wounded in the assassination attempt, and fled with a bullet in his leg. Unable to seek
medical assistance for fear of capture, the legend states that Hussein cut the bullet out of
his leg with his own pocket knife. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 4-5.
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Under 'Arrif and Baqr', Iraq began adopting a pro-Nasser policy. This
policy brought Iraq into subsequent wars against Israel, and served to
support the Palestinian terrorist organizations. By 1963 Saddam Hussein
had returned to Iraq. He soon took charge of the "internal security" of
the nation, a euphemism for assassination purges. In 1966 Hussein took
part in a Ba'ath internal revolt against 'Arrif. This revolt failed, largely
due to Hussein's failure to secure the support of traditional military leaders. Hussein was jailed, but he soon bribed his way out and immediately
went to work planning the next coup.s
In 1968 a two-phase coup by Ba'athists overthrew the 'Arrif government. The first phase, on July 17, 1968, established a new nationalist regime with Baqr' as president. On July 30, 1968, Saddam Hussein conducted the second phase, a violent and ruthless purge of all nonBa'athists from the regime. Soon after, Saddam Hussein became the Deputy Chairman and strong man in the Revolutionary Command Council. 0
For the next ten years, Hussein consolidated his power and influence
by purging the party of disloyal people, thereby making the party menebers loyal to him, personally. In 1979, Baqr' "resigned" in a procedure
engineered by Hussein. Hussein then placed Baqr' under house arrest,
thus clearing the way to unfettered exercise of power.8 1 Predictably, a
bloody purge followed wherein Hussein exposed "coups" and conspiracies. The purge led to the execution of 21 people, and the jailing of 47
senior Ba'athists, most of whom were military leaders.32 Hussein had
taken unquestionable control of the country.
In 1980 Iraq initiated a crisis with Iran over the legality of the 1975
Algiers Treaty (resolving issues over the Kurds). Hussein hoped that a
war with ancient and religious rival Iran would unite the Arab world behind him.s Hussein also hoped to gain support from the Western powers
who had hostile feelings towards Iran stemming from the 1979 revolution
and hostage crisis. Relying on these assumptions, and having no other
substantial military threat in the area to keep it in check, Iraq attacked
Iran on September 20, 1980."
To accomplish its goal of uniting the Arab world, with Baghdad as its
center, and to hold outside threats at bay, Iraq undertook a massive mili29. Id. at 5-6.
30. Id. at 6.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 7-8.
33. Id. at 8.
'34. Professor Gholam Razi, U.S. Institute of Peace, Middle East Forum (C-SPAN television broadcast, Oct 5, 1990). Speakers included Jerrold Post, Jay Rothman, Gholam Razi,
Harold Saunders, Allen Gearson, Sam Lewis and Alexander George [hereinafter cited by
speaker's name]. By 1980, the United States was out of Iran and the area.
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tary buildup. Towards that end, Iraq developed and used chemical warheads.35 Additionally, it stockpiled large quantities of plastic explosives,
presumediy for use in terrorist attacks.
The failure of deterrence and a vulnerable opponent combined to cause
Iraq to strike at Iran in 1980, and that same combination caused Iraq to
strike Kuwait in 1990. In 1980, Iraq viewed Iran as being vulnerable after
its 1979 revolution.3 The Iranian transfer of power left its military weak,
and the Algiers Treaty provided Iraq with the excuse to use force. In
1990, Iraq viewed Kuwait as vulnerable, and the absence of any apparent
deterrence threat permitted Iraq to attack again.3 As a pretense, Iraq
stated that "foreigners" within Kuwait, were trying to destroy Iraq
economically."
A chasm exists between Iraq and the rest of the international community, one that Iraq shows little interest in closing. Though Iraq's leadership is extremist, this extreme position is what strikes the cords of religious and nationalistic pride. Though Iraq's responses to challenges from
the Western world may seem flippant at times, the responses may reflect
fundamental beliefs that they are doing Allah's work. Perhaps the best
example of the rift between Iraq and the West is the treatment of civilians during the Gulf Crisis. Though made through double-talk, Iraq's lack
of adherence to any accepted norms or international legal principles is
clear. "We will not accept international law. . . . We have to protect our
own people and we do not accept your double standards. . . . They are
our guests and they will contribute to an ideal course of peace, peace,
peace. '3 9 Iraq's recent history is that of a country led by a "despotic Arab
35. Even more chilling, Iraq is within months of developing a biological threat and is
striving fervently to obtain a nuclear capability. Confrontationin the Gulf; Sacking of Kuwait is Pressuring U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1990, at A4 (reported Iraq may be able to
produce biological weapons early next year). William Safire, The Phony War, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 1, 1990, at A21 (Iraq may produce nuclear weapons within three years, or sooner).
William Safire, Survival, N.Y. TIMiS, Nov. 5, 1990, at A21. William Safire, in an editorial,
tied the hanging of Farzad Bazoft, a British journalist, to Iraq's effort to get nuclear weapons. Bazoft had disguised himself as a medical technician in an effort to investigate the
August 1989 explosion of a munitions plant in Al Qaqaa. What was being produced was
HMX, high melting point explosives, used to implode Uranium 235 in nuclear weapons.
Saffire explained Iraqi technicians are again hard at work, and Iraq is on the verge of obtaining a nuclear capability. See N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 11, 1990, at A12. Most recently, Iraq's
progress toward obtaining a nuclear capability has come under close scrutiny, and expert
opinions differ.
36. TASK FORCE, supra note 17, at 6. The Soviet Union was backing Iraq at the time.
37. See Debate, supra note 10.
38. TASK FORCE, supra note 17, at 10-12.
39. Tariq Aziz, Iraqi Foreign Minister, in Nora Boustany, Iraq Offers Choice to Bush:
Peace Talks or Disaster, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 1990, at 24. However, on Dec. 6, 1990 Iraq
decided to free the hostages to promote diplomacy. At that time, Iraq apologized for the
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power structure,' ' 0 set on re-establishing a united Arab nation. Iraq will
not voluntarily consent to international law or standard unless it is within
Iraq's immediate interest to so comply.
V.

SADDAM HUSSEIN

Saddam Hussein presents the world with a radical, militarized, totalitarian regime, designed to change the status quo. Luttwak's quote, given
at the beginning of the Middle East chapter, is particularly descriptive of
Saddam Hussein.' Hussein possesses confidence in the strength and ability of his armed forces. Even though his future may be bleak, Hussein is
exploiting his strength in the profitable world of Middle East oil while he
can. He has persuaded himself of victory while ignoring the cost, and sees
great benefit in continuing this course of action.
As stated previously, Iraq and Saddam Hussein are one in the same. An
examination of Saddam Hussein's life is a walk through the recent history
of Iraq.'2 Saddam Hussayn Al-Takriti ("Saddam Hussein") was born on
April 28, 1937, and grew up poor in Takrit. His education was very limited, and what little schooling he received occurred while he was between
the ages of ten and sixteen. His uncle, HirAllah Talafa, a strong supporter of the Rashid Ali al-Kailani, greatly influenced Hussein. Talafa
participated in the pro-Nazi, anti-British rebellion of 1941, and was
purged from the military because of his role in the rebellion. Talafa reand bitterness toward the British and
turned to Takrit full of frustration
4
regime.
Baghdad
royal
the
The Arab defeat at the hands of the Israelis sent more angry officers
home to Takrit full of bitterness, frustration, and conspiracies to someday
regain Arab superiority. Thus, hatred for the Jews, rage for the Western
imperialists, and desires to revive Iraq as the center of pan-Arab power
and glory influenced Saddam during his youth."
In 1956, Saddam Hussein and some other Takrit youngsters moved to
Baghdad for "schooling." However, Hussein quickly formed the group
into a street gang known for their cruelty and violence. In the 1950s
Gamal Abdel Nasser began to revive pan-Arab feelings with his aspirations for the Arab world. Hussein watched admiringly. Pan-Arab ideals
captivity, and acknowledged the captivity was not "correct from the humanitarian and practical standpoints." NY. TiMEs, Dec. 7, 1990, at 1.
40. TASK FORCE, supra note 17, at 1.
41. LuTTWAK, supra note 11.
42. TASK FORCE, supra note 17, at 1-6.
43. Id. at 1-2.
44. Id. at 2-3.
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were "fertile ground" for Ba'athist activities, and were in line with the
ideals planted in Saddam's mind by HirAllah Talafah.4
Saddam's rise to power began with his link to the Ba'ath Party. The
Ba'ath Party enabled him to seek the ideological goal of his uncle, while
at the same time enabled him to pursue personal wealth and power.
When Qassim refused 'Aflaq's suggestion to join Nasser, the Ba'athists
decided to assassinate Qassim. Hussein led the attempt, and fled to Syria
when the attempt failed. From Syria he travelled to Egypt to participate
in the pan-Arab Nasserist movement, headquartered in Cairo. The movement, based around a Palestinian revolutionary radicalism, was designed
to rally Arabs everywhere, irrespective of national leaders, goals or initiatives, and bring them under the control of Nasser. It was during this time
that Saddam met 'Abd al-Rahman 'Abd al-Rauf 'Arafat al-Qudwa alHussaini (Yassir Arafat), a young revolutionary cousin of the Grand
Mufti Hajj Amin al-Hussaini.4
Hussein supported Arafat's opposition to the Palestinian establishment
from the outset, and urged Nasser to make Arafat the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization ("PLO"). Hussein arranged support for the
PLO from the Soviet Union, and assisted both in Nasser's backing of
Arafat, as well as the Soviet dominance over the Palestinian movement.
Thus, began a long relationship between Hussein and the PLO. By the
1970s, Hussein turned the PLO into a tool of his purging operations, and
in return, provided the Palestinian terrorists with training, facilities,
weapons, intelligence, and diplomatic services (e.g., secured mail pouches)
all over the world.
The 1963 overthrow of Qassim provided Hussein the opportunity to return to Baghdad. 47 His services as one who could purge the new government of its enemies were in demand, and he quickly began his assent to
the top, despite numerous clandestine military cells within the Ba'ath organization. Hussein was fortunate to have a Takriti boyhood friend (the
son of HirAllah Talafa, Hussein's favorite uncle), Adanan HirAllah, as a
staff officer in Baghdad. HirAllah prevented the military Ba'athists from
assassinating Hussein, and the Takrit connection became a cornerstone of
4
Hussein's eventual power base. '

In 1963, Hussein married Sajida Talafah, the daughter of his favorite
uncle. The marriage enabled Hussein to bring HirAllah Talafah back into
politics, a move Hussein used very effectively. When Baqr' was installed
as Vice-President, Hussein used Talafah, a cousin and old army friend of
Baqr', to get Hussein access to the very top of the military-dominated
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

3.
4-6.
5.
5-6.
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Ba'ath elite-even though Hussein was much younger and never served in
the military. Hussein became the chief of internal security, at first directing his efforts for the good of the Ba'athists, but eventually using his
position to solidify his own power. An extremely loyal clique developed
around Hussein, resulting in widespread fear among those who opposed
him."
When Hussein acted too quickly in 1966 against 'Arrif, he was jailed.
He bribed his way out of prison, and escaped to Takrit10 He immediately
went to work planning the next coup, but included plans to involve top
military leaders to insure success. At the same time, he established his
"security forces" as alternatives to the military to conduct his "post
revolution" purges. Hussein began to rely solely on family and Takrit loyalists, those loyal to Saddam Hussein. When 'Arrif was overthrown in
1968, Hussein took over Iraq's security and installed Baqr' as the titular
president."'
During the Baqr' reign, Hussein systematically removed disloyal elements from the Ba'ath organization, and transformed it into an organization loyal to Saddam Hussein. He also sought to expand Iraq's role in
international affairs, mainly through the Soviet Union and the support of
subversion efforts, in hopes of becoming the region's dominant power. His
efforts to support the PLO resulted from his earlier ties with Arafat, and
he was strongly influenced by Nasser's manipulation of the Palestinians
to consolidate pan-Arab power.2
By the mid-1970s, Hussein's collection of family and Takritis at the top
of the government had become so pervasive, he felt compelled to pass a
law forbidding the use of family names.63 Hussein consolidated his power
to the point that by 1979 Baqr' "resigned" to allow Hussein to take over
as President. Hussein then reorganized government power around key
family members and Takriti loyalists.4
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 6.
52. Id. at 7-8.
53. Id. at 7. He claimed the use of family names was forced on the Arabs by the Western
imperialists. His law was simply a way of concealing the number of family and hometown
friends now occupying the highest seats in government.
54. Id. at 7-8. Adanan HirAllah, his childhood friend, became his Minister of Defense;
HirAllah Talafah, his favorite uncle, became an "economic transactions" advisor (to acquire
nuclear and other sensitive weapons equipment); his half-brothers took over the intelligence
service and public security; his oldest son chaired the Revolutionary Command Council; and
other sons and daughters were married into families of high ranking generals or government
officials.
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Hussein's violent background appears to have taught him that the only
real power is brute force.16 As a result, Hussein built a massive army"
with an incredibly destructive arsenal, which he has been willing to use to
further his goals. He carried on an eight-year war with Iran, during which
he used poison gas in contravention to the Geneva treaties. When confronted with uprisings by his own people in Kurdistan, Hussein again
used poison gas to quell the disturbances. In need of money because of
his long war with Iran, he demanded minimum pricing for oil. When Kuwait did not agree, he invaded the country.6 7 While the common man
thinks Hussein is a madman, psychologists claim Hussein is predictable
and understandable. The problem is that he is "dangerous to the
extreme."'"
Hussein's violent background has controlled his psyche, and it has
manifested itself in his ruthless control of all people around him." Hussein's paranoia for his safety (with good reason) causes him to surround
himself with "yes men," but to trust no one.60 He had his two half-brothers arrested in 1983, and removed them from their minister positions.
When his childhood friend, Adanan HirAllah, became too popular because of the war with Iran, Hussein had him killed in a "helicopter accident."61 Ex-president Baqr' met a similar fate in 1983 (through a "car
accident") when his popularity began to rise and Hussein's popularity fell
due to the war with Iran.es Another favorite General, Mahir 'Abd
al'Rashied, was forced into retirement after his victory in the southern
55. See Jim Hoagland, Diplomacy, Saddam Style: Look for the Bomb Under the Robe,
WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 1990, at A27. An early example of Hussein's ruthlessness occurred at a

"peace talk" Hussein (then Vice Dictator) set up with rebellious Kurds in 1971. The emissary of Hussein was told to secretly tape record the meeting by pushing a record button on a
hidden tape player when the Kurd leader was close. At the meeting, the emissary did so,
thereby setting off a bomb hidden in the player. The emissary and a servant were killed; the
Kurd leader survived. Id. James A. Phillips of the Heritage Foundation says of the current
situation, "Saddam understands force. Ultimately, it will not be the embargo, but only the
threat of force or its actual use that will force Saddam to give up the booty of his aggression
and pull out of Kuwait." DAILY PROGRESS, Nov. 13, 1990, at 1.
56. His military is estimated to be approximately 1,000,000 soldiers from a population of
17,000,000. Approximately 430,000 soldiers, 5,500 tanks, and hundreds of tons of poison gas
are in or near Kuwait.
57. See Debate, supra note 10.
58. Post, supra note 34.
59. See CNN television broadcast, Oct. 9, 1990.
60. Anthony Cordesman, author of Lessons in Modern Warfare: The Iran-Iraq War,
says, "When Saddam Hussein is under pressure, he surrounds himself with true loyalists."
Saddam has a reputation for staffing his inner circles of power with members of his extended family, and natives of his hometown. See ARMY TIMES, Nov. 19, 1990, at 12.
61. Id.
62. See Louise LIEF, Saddam Hussein's Three-ring Circus, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT,
Sept. 10, 1990, at 32.
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theater (his demise would have followed too closely on the heals of HirAllah's death). s
Though there are numerous instances of Hussein's brutality, two particular stories exemplify this. At the outset of his term as President in
1979, Hussein rounded up his adversaries and ordered them to be executed. The executions were videotaped. Hussein then made it mandatory
for his staff and government officials to watch the videotape."s Jack Anderson reported an even more direct and violent example of Hussein's
brutality: At a cabinet meeting a minister expressed a view contrary to
that of Saddam Hussein.ss Hussein asked the adviser to step outside the
room to discuss the difference of opinion. Outside the room, Hussein put
a pistol to the adviser's head and shot him dead."
Saddam Hussein sees himself as "Nebuchadnezzar II," determined to
reunite the "Arab Nation. '" s7 Complete with dreams and visions from Mohammed,'$ Hussein has undertaken a personal drive to change the face of
63. See TASK FORCE, supra note 17, at 9; see also Lief, supra note 62, at 32. "He has
murdered a mentor who knew him since infancy, arrested his brothers and killed his cousins
to make sure no one forgets who's in charge." Id.
64. See Talking Points, Amnesty Int'l, October 1990 [hereinafter Talking Points]. The
use of video taped executions was used recently by Hussein-he compelled his closest aids
to view the trial and execution of the Ceausescus. See TASK FORCE, supra note 17, at 8.
65. See Talking Points, supra note 64. Other sources report this minister was Riyadh
Ibrahim, Minister of Health. According to these sources, Ibrahim asked Hussein to temporarily step down from power to help resolve the war with Iran.
66. See WAsH. PosT, Aug. 13, 1990, at 13. Hussein made it a capital offense to insult him,
to espouse Zionism, to leave the Ba'ath Party, and to encourage others to do so. It has been
reported that Hussein executed 120 army officers for objecting to his invasion of Kuwait.
Hussein informers have infiltrated every facet of Iraqi life, and people cannot even express
their opinions at home. See Talking Points, supra note 64.
To further insure his stranglehold, Hussein has recently replaced LTG Nazir al-Khazraji,
Chief of Staff since 1985, with GEN Hussein Rashid, commander of the Republican Guards.
GEN Rashid is believed to be from Hussein's hometown of Tikrit. Also dismissed was Oil
Minister Issam Chalabi, who was replaced by Hussein's cousin and son-in-law, BG Hussein
Kamel. Kamel is also Minister of Industry and Military Industrilization, and is believed to
be in charge of the country's internal security. See Hussein Ousts Chief of Staff Amid Signs
of Army Dissent, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1990, at A13.
67. TASK FORCE, supra note 17, at 10. In an effort to renew the glory of Babylon and its
powerful king, Nebuchadnezzar, Hussein has tried to rebuild the ancient city with its hanging gardens. However, his drive to rebuild Babylon and revive the imperial power, military
prowess, and vision of King Nebuchadnezzar have been temporarily stalled due to the Gulf
Crisis. See WAsH. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1990, at D4; and John F. Burns, Mideast Tension; New
Babylon is Stalled by a Modern Upheaval, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 11, 1990, at A13. He also compares himself with Saladdin, a 12th century Muslim warrior who united much of the Arab
world. However, Hussein ignores that Saladdin was a Kurd. See Task Force, supra note 17,
at 10.
68. See DAILY PROGRESS, Oct. 23, 1990, at 1.
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the Middle East and to eliminate the imperialists' "lines in the sand.""

Disrupting the status quo is essential to such a scheme, which makes his
invasion of Kuwait, his refusal to obey sanctions, and his labeling the
United Nations as a tool of developed countries to suppress underdevel-

oped countries, predictable actions when taken in context. 70 It is clear
Hussein views military might as the means to his ends and perceives
ruthless control as essential to completion of his vision.

Although already perceived as a brutal ruler, Hussein will be at his
most dangerous when he feels there is no way out. If he is going to die
regardless of what course he takes, he would rather "die for a sheep as he
would for a lamb."'1 He possesses the four characteristics that indicate
explosiveness: unbounded self-exultation; unconstrained use of aggression; no conscience; and a paranoid outlook.72 "If he has to lose, everybody loses.'7 3
Believing reality comes from power, Hussein presents the world with an

example of a leader who has "effective" power as opposed to "legitimate"
power.74 Indeed, his decisions are followed, though this is done out of fear
rather than as the result of any "legitimate" process. To Hussein, morality and ethics are simply tools or excuses the powerful use to manipulate
69. In this regard, he adheres to the Ba'ath ideology that all Arab frontiers are of a
provisional nature, created by Western imperialists. Hussein intends to fulfill the Ba'ath
prophecies and ideology by restoring Baghdad as the center of the Arab world (over Damascus and Cairo) with him as its leader. Note that his appeal to Islamic sentiments and its
supra-national identity is reminiscent of Nasser's great campaigns. See TASK FORCE, supra
note 17, at 11.
70. See TASK FORCE, supra note 17, at 11-12. Hussein is exploiting three aspects of Arab
culture to achieve his ends. First, he emphasizes the commitment pan-Arab glory deserves.
Second, he creates incentives for other regimes to dismember existing states under the banner of an anti-imperialist struggle. Third, he exploits the Palestinian cause and the Arab
sentiment to "never side with a foreigner against an Arab-at least not in public," long held
by Arabs. By referring to the Gulf Crisis as a Jihad, Hussein seeks to render illegitimate
Arab regimes opposing Iraq.
71. An Arab saying referring to the fact that Hussein's perspective is that if he is going
to go down, he might as well go down for something big. Interviews with Abdel Massadeh,
supra note 18.
72. See Post, supra note 34.
73. See Rothman, supra note 34.
74. Professor Moore describes two intersecting spheres of power, an "effective" sphere
and a "legitimate" sphere. One should make distinctions between attempts to establish
world order, depending on whether the attempt falls primarily in one sphere or the other.
The "effective" sphere represents pure force, brute force if necessary, void of moral and
social authority. The sphere is termed "effective" because, due to the reality that directives
given within the sphere are followed, it excludes many decisions that are followed due to the
concept of being just. The "legitimate" sphere represents authority properly used. A third
sphere, that of "law," partially intersects with the effective sphere but is wholly subsumed
within the authoritative sphere.

CASE AGAINST SADDAM

1992]

579

the weak. He cites the United States' support of Israel on the West Bank
to show that morality is only an instrument used by the strong to maintain the status quo. 5 He therefore links his move into Kuwait as an overall solution to the Middle East problems and as an effort to stifle a coali7
tion against him.

Hussein may be a good tactician, but in the larger perspective, he is a
poor strategic thinker.7 7 Just as in the war with Iran, Kuwait provided
Hussein with battles which he could relay to his people claiming victory.
However, just as he did not win a strategic victory over Iran, Kuwait may
not provide Hussein an ultimate victory. Similarly, the gas attacks on the
Kurds may have solved an immediate problem, but the lasting impressions Hussein made on the world may have been what caused such immediate and overwhelming response against him when he moved into Kuwait. He certainly did not anticipate the unified international response.
One explanation for his severely restricted view of the world has been
that during more than ten years as President, Hussein has traveled only
to Moscow and Paris in his position as head of state, most likely due to a
fear of leaving anyone else in control. According to Professor Harrop,
Hussein's iron grip has not united Iraq as much as it has "atomized" Iraq.
By splintering the country, destroying communal identities (such as was
done in 1988 with genocide of Kurdistan depopulation in Halabja), and
by being unyielding in the abuse of power, he maintains a primordial control of the country. 78
Hussein's ability to reason and even compromise stand out as paradoxical. While he is willing to withstand enormous hardship and pain for a
questionable cause (such as the war with Iran), he can turn around and
give up hard-earned assets with little hesitation (such as the Shatt alArab waterway gained during the war). 7 ' Contrary to common belief,
Hussein is "dynamically interacted with the situation. He can reverse his
position." 0 Hussein "is very practical and pragmatic when it comes to
transient and temporary compromises" that further his long term
objectives."
While it is unlikely Hussein would voluntarily submit himself to the
jurisdiction of a Grievous Offender Tribunal, he has taken unexpected
75.
76.
77.
(Sept.
78.

See Razi, supra note 34.
TASK FORCE,supra note 17, at 10-11.
J.N. Moore, Class lectures at University of Virginia Law School, Charlottesville, VA
1990).
Professor Scott Harrop, University of Virginia, Address on The Iraqi Invasion of

Kuwait, A U.S. Foreign Policy Perspective (Sept. 5, 1990).
79. Id.
80. See Post, supra note 34.

81.

TASK FORCE,

supra note 17, at 1.
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steps (perhaps for the attention they bring) in the past. As the situation
tightens around him, Hussein may see a trial as a stage for his version of
the facts, as another possible delaying tactic, or as a life saving measure
in front of an overwhelming military force lurching at his borders. A trial
may produce an unexpected result, an actual appearance by Hussein, or
at least someone on his behalf. Hussein sees himself on the pantheon of
great leaders, and he does not want to lose that vision of himself. Hus-,
sein's craving for ittention, his need to be at the center of attention, and
his desire to have the eyes of the world on him may assist in his eventual
demise. 82 A trial would give him that opportunity.
VI. THE UNITED NATIONS
"[Tlhe United Nations has silenced most of its detractors. A body once
scorned as a dithering talk-shop has now mobilized impressively to punish Iraq's aggression in the Persian Gulf. . . .the U.N. has also offered
.. .hopes for a new world order to resolve conflicts by multilateral diplo3
macy and collective security. 6'
A.

The General Assembly

The post-Cold War environment provides the United Nations with an
opportunity to work as its framers (and the League of Nations' founders)
envisioned, and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait presents the world a precedent setting opportunity. Today, rather than focusing on defending the
Fulda gap, the United States and Western powers are confronted with
budget limitations, troop reductions, and fluctuating threats resulting
from the dramatic changes over the last year. The Soviet Union is immersed in its own economic and political turmoils, and China remains
secluded in an effort to resist the winds of change sweeping elsewhere.
Each superpower has found the United Nations to be a convenient, tool
for advancing its own cause, or helping to control belligerents who
threaten peace.
The increased role of the United Nations was summarized in a New
York Times editorial: "It used to be said that serious questions of international peace and security were beyond the capacity of the United Nations and that, its main practical usefulness therefore lay in the economic
and social field."' Change is urgently needed. "Without the paralyzing
constrictions of the cold war, a greatly improved process is possible. It is
82. Id.
83. Getting Serious About the U.N., N.Y. TimSs, Sept. 24, 1990, at A1S.
84. Bryan Urquhart, A Revived U.N. Needs Lively Leaders, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1990,
at A19.
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time to make the international system work." 85 The increased hope comes
from the actors adopting more objective perspectives, creating room for
large consensus measures. The Soviet Union, perhaps acknowledging its
own role, recognizes that "the world, through the United Nations, has
made unprecedented progress in the peaceful resolution of conflicts."1' 0
However, the General Assembly is not designed to be the means of
maintaining order. Though peacekeeping missions have been authorized
by the General Assembly, such missions have resulted from the Security
Council's inability to act. One major drawback to peacekeeping missions
is that participation is voluntary. When a country does not feel that it is
in its best interest to participate, or when a country wants to withdraw, it
is free to do S.87 Any attempt based on state acquiescence by the General
Assembly would undoubtedly result in a situation similar to that feared
by proponents of a world criminal court.
How dreadful and antithetical to the intentions of the proponents it
would be if our good intentions created nothing more than a politically
expedient dumping ground for politically sensitive cases. Likewise, how
unfortunate it would be if this complex endeavor had the effect of diverting attention or resources away from more practical and readily achievable means ....

8

For this reason, article 24 of the United Nations Charter confers "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security"'' -on the Security Council, and gives the Security Council staying
power with mandatory compliance under article 25.90
B.

The Security Council

The United Nations designed the Security Council to be its workhorse
for maintaining international peace and security. The United Nations re-'
quires parties to seek peaceful settlements, but allows the Security Council to step into the dispute when the Security Council deems necessary
under United Nations article 33.1 Likewise, should the parties fail to settle the dispute, article 37 requires them to take the issue to the Security
85. Id.
86. Paul Lewis, Confrontation in the Gulf; Security Council Adds Air Embargo to Iraqi
Sanctions, N.Y. Tiats, Sept. 26, 1990, at Al.
87. E.g., when the United States Marine barracks were bombed in Beirut, the United
States pulled out of Lebanon.
88. Jason Abrams, U.S. Alternate Representative to the Sixth Committee (Establishment of an International Criminal Court), United Nations, Nov. 14, 1989.
89. U.N. CHARTER art. 24 1 1.
90. U.N. CHARTER art. 25, 1.
91. U.N. CHARTER art. 33, 1-2.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

Council.'" The Security Council is given additional investigatory powers,
decision powers, and the authority to call upon members to apply measures to enforce Security Council decisions."s Finally, but most importantly, article 25 makes decisions of the Security Council binding on
members '"
World realities require the Security Council to serve as the governing
body for highly controversial matters. As a practical matter, the superpowers have the means of enforcement and are expected to use them."s
For example, in the Gulf Crisis, the United Nations Secretary General
could not have imposed a blockade on Iraq without the Security Council
authorizing the superpowers to employ their naval forces. The world's
population and power are not distributed equally. As a consequence, the
General Assembly's "one State one vote" is neither equitable nor practical, and, therefore, it is not given much credibility by countries with the
power to act.
The authority of the Security Council to act, the expectations States
have of the Security Council, and the requirement of States to follow the
decisions of the Security Council, make it the "authoritative decision
maker." In theory, the Security Council has the means, the authority, and
the power to enforce the necessary sanctions to create world order. And
to the extent it asserts itself successfully in this area, it further anchors
itself in the area of "the rule of law."
Reality, however, produces a less than ideal result. The dream of collective self-defense has not materialized under the leadership of the Security
Council mainly due to problems stemming from the Cold War. Though
the Security Council can authorize measures, actual implementation is
left up to individual States. The forces to be made available to the Security Council under article 439' have never been implemented.' 7 Having no
police or military force of its own, the Security Council is unable to force
or direct action unless there is a cooperating state. Building large blocks
92.

U.N.

CHARTER

art. 37,

1.

93. U.N. CHARTER art. 39, 1; U.N. CHARTER art. 41, 1; U.N. CHARTER art. 42, 1 1.
94. U.N. CHARTER art. 25, 1.
95. Flora Lewis, Foreign Affairs; Are States All Equal?, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 10, 1990, at
p.23. Flora Lewis writes
The gulf crisis is a new test of the community's will and ability to respect laws
that all profess in the abstract. But it is also a reminder that law is not selfenforcing. Cynical realpolitik, based on self-interest without standards, was carried much too far. But it cannot be replaced with utter idealism. The "rights" of
nations are limited, and the limits must be imposed by those who can.

Id.
96.

U.N. CHARTER art. 43,

97.

J.N. Moore, F.S. Tipson, R.F. Turner, National Security Law, 364 at 71 (1990); see

1.

also N.Y. TIMzs, Oct. 2, 1990, at 1.
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of consenting States when enforcment of sanctions is contemplated thus
becomes important, as the Gulf Crisis demonstrated.
In efforts to enforce sanctions against Hussein, the Security Council
passed eleven resolutions between August 2, 1990 and November 29, 1990:
(1) August 2, 1990: Condemned the invasion of Kuwait and demanded
immediate, unconditional withdrawal;" (2) August 6, 1990: Initiated
trade and financial embargo against Iraq and "occupied" Kuwait;" (3)
August 9, 1990: Declared Iraq's annexation of Kuwait null and void; 1°" (4)
August 18, 1990: Demanded the immediate release of foreigners and the
right of diplomats to visit their nationals; 101 (5) August 25, 1990: Called
on member states with maritime forces in the area to halt and verify
cargo bound for Iraq, and to use the Military Staff Committee;10 2 (6) September 13, 1990: Reaffirmed Iraqi responsibility for foreigners' safety, and
reviewed situation regarding food supplies; 08 (7) September 16, 1990:
Condemned Iraqi aggression against diplomatic premises and personnel;10 4 (8) September 25, 1990: Imposed air embargo on traffic both into
and out of Iraq;'"1 (9) October 29, 1990: Asked countries to document
human rights violations and economic damage resulting from the invasion.10 6 The resolution also demanded Iraq cease taking hostages and demanded Iraq provide foreigners with food and water; 07 (10) November
28, 1990: Condemned Iraq's changing of Kuwaiti demographics and destruction of Kuwaiti civil records; 08 (11) November 29, 1990: Authorized
the use of force. 1' 9
These resolutions do not represent technical violations of international
law, these strike at the core principles of world order." 0 The resolutions
represent dramatic efforts to force Hussein out of Kuwait, but each relies
on Hussein yielding to its effect. Should Hussein continue to hold out, the
98. U.N. Security Council Resolutions on Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait 1:2 DISPATCH 75
(Sept. 10, 1990).
99. Id. at 75-76.
100. Id. at 76.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. U.N. Security Council Resolutions on Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait 1:4 DISPATCH 112
(Sept. 24, 1990).
104. Id. at 112-13.
105. U.N. Security Council Resolution on Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait, 1:5 DISPATCH 128,
128-29 (Oct. 1, 1990).
106. Id.
107. U.N. Security Council Resolutions on Iraq'sInvasion of Kuwait, 1:14 DISPATCH 296
(Dec. 3, 1990).
108. Id. at 298.
109. Id.
110. See Debate, supra note 10.
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logical progression is to go to war.' The time is "ripe" for considering all
options and taking new action short of war.
One instance where the Security Council could push in a new direction
is its Military Staff Committee. Like the Security Council and the United
Nations at large, the Military Staff Committee was paralyzed until recently. Then, in October 1990, the Soviet Union suggested reviving it.
With varying degrees of enthusiasm, each of the other Security Council
members agreed and the Committee has revamped its meetings.' 2 The
resurgence of the Military Staff Committee is an example of the willingness of the world to reach for approaches and tools never used before.
Though the name "Military Staff Committee" may conjure up images
of using military force, a recent statement by General Norman
Schwartzkopf, commander of United States forces in Saudi Arabia, shows
that military leaders are sometimes the last to advocate the use of force.
He said that he was not "dovish," and he certainly was not "hawkish." He
considered himself "owlish": wise enough to know the United States
should not use the military if the other sanctions might work.'" The time
is appropriate for other initiatives, and the Security Council should be
the focal point of action.
111. DAILY PROGRESS, Nov. 15, 1990 at 10. In achieving the resolution authorizing the
use of force, Secretary of State James A. Baker III traveled to seven countries and met with
leaders of eight countries the first week of November seeking support for a "military resolution." He met with the foreign ministers of Security Council members Ethiopia, Ivory Coast,
and Zaire on Nov. 17, 1990 for the same reason. The "administration had decided to seek
approval of a U.N. resolution [seeking military force] before the end of [November]" due to
the Security Council Chair rotating from the United States to Yemen (which sides with
Iraq) on December 1, 1990. The resolution passed on November 29, 1990, with a vote of 12-2
(Cuba and Yemen, China abstained). Id. Also, on Nov. 7, 1990, President Bush ordered
nearly a doubling of United States forces in Saudi Arabia, from 230,000 to approximately
400,000, to allow for an "offensive" option. N.Y. TiMEs, Nov. 8, 1990, at Al.
112. Paul Lewis, Confrontation in the Gulf; Security Council's Military Panel Reviews
Naval Efforts to Enforce Trade Embargo, N.Y. TiMEs, Sept. 19, 1990, at p. All. Though the
meetings never actually stopped, attendance was delegated to subordinates, and agendas
were unimportant. Michael R. Gordon, Confrontationin the Gulf; Top Soviet General Tells
U.S. Not to Attack in Gulf, N.Y. TiMEs, Oct. 3, 1990, at Al. On Oct. 2, 1990, General
Moiseyev, the Soviet Military Chief, proposed to President Bush the Military Staff Committee be activated. The Staff could "prepare an additional resolution setting a timetable for
resolving the crisis." There is still resistance to the Military Staff Committee flexing its
muscle, as China insists it discuss only operations approved by the Security Council (limiting discussion at the moment to naval operations in the Gulf). Paul Lewis, Security Council's Military Panel Reviews Naval Effort to Enforce Trade Embargo, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19,
1990, at 11; N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1990, at 12.
113. Televised interview with General N. Schwartzkopf, Barbara Walters Special, ABC
Television, 1990.

CASE AGAINST SADDAM

19921

VII.

ANTI-IRAQI COALITION

The last major participant in the Gulf Crisis is the catch-all group of
states that form the "anti-Iraqi" coalition."" Led by the United States,
the anti-Iraqi coalition has taken a firm stand against Hussein's aggression. The coalition has brought the United States and the Soviet Union
together; it has put United States forces on the ground in enormous numbers in Saudi Arabia; it has resulted in Arab forces being deployed
against other Arabs; and it has created strange "bedfellows" exemplified
by Syria and the United States being on the same side.1 "
Only the most dramatic of circumstances would result in such vast
realignments of alliances. Naturally, Great Britain expressed outrage similar to that expressed by the United States and it deployed forces to the
region. Japan and Germany quickly responded with financial and vocal
support for the United States' action. Consistent with the changes in the
Soviet Union, the Soviets did not interfere as they have in the past. Perhaps because of their own internal problems, China maintained a low profile. " 6 Most extraordinay was the plea for Western military assistance to
protect one Arab country from another. The aligning of Western forces
with Egyptian, Syrian, Saudi and other Arab forces was indicative of the
extreme divisiveness among Arab sentiments and the hostility felt towards Hussein.
Responding to Kuwait's plea for help, and asked by the Saudis to help
defend their country from the Iraqi threat, the United States sent forces
to Saudi Arabia. This move was permissible under article 51 of the
United Nations Charter as collective self-defense. 11 7 The United States'
example has been followed by other countries, though certainly not to the
extent of United States deployments. The United Nations Charter also

114. Of course, there are some states such as Yemen and Libya that support Iraq, and
others such as Iran and Jordan have leaned in both directions. Participation by these States

may eventually prove to be crucial, but to date their activities have not been overwhelming
factors.
115. George Will refers to Syria's President Assad as a mass murderer and a certified

terrorist "who is devouring Lebanon." Yet, when President Bush went to Saudi Arabia to be
with the troops for Thanksgiving, Will met with Syria's President Assad. See DAILY PROGRESS, Nov. 8, 1990.
116. The coalition illustrates how the world of diplomacy operates, where the exchange
of favors is "quid pro quo." By siding with the coalition, Egypt has been able to write off
billions of dollars in debt, Syria has gained more control in Lebanon, China has received a
30 million dollar loan, and the Soviet Union is to receive help with its economy. See DAILY
PROGRESS, Dec. 11, 1990, at AS.

117. U.N.

CHARTER

art. 51, 111.
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recognizes the ability of states to join in regional enforcement action, and,
of course, to engage in individual self-defense.118
What is at issue now is the language of article 51 that nothing impairs
the right of self-defense "until the Security Council has taken measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security."' 1' The United
States and other countries have turned to the United Nations to build the
coalition against Iraq. By passing resolutions condemning Iraq, it would
appear that the Security Council has begun "taking measures necessary
to maintain international peace and security." Should the United States
or any other country act independent of Security Council approval and
strike Iraq, one could argue that such action is contrary to the intent of
the Charter. For this reason, Secretary of State James A. Baker III travelled to many states to obtain support for a resolution authorizing military action. 1 0
VIII.

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

To place a recommendation in context, the perspectives and expectations of the various parties must be made clear. The frame of mind of the
decision maker with regard to demands and expectations placed on him,
with whom and what he identifies, and the compatibility of the sanction
with basic community policy, are issues that should be considered. The
perspectives of Saddam Hussein are quite different from those of the
United States.
Demands are expressions of value, such as positive commitment to
minimum order. 2 ' Saddam Hussein has expressed no commitment to a
minimum order other than his own ruthless and abusive tactics to maintain control through the use of fear and intimidation. As described before,
Hussein's control is "effective" but not "authoritative." The United Nations and the anti-Iraqi coalition have expressed their commitment to
minimum order through the vehicle of the United Nations. It is in reliance upon that commitment that the coalition of states have passed resolution after resolution in attempts to persuade Iraq to leave Kuwait. The
commitment to minimum order also explains the United States' resistance to pleas from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to proceed quickly with a
military attack.
118. U.N. CHARTER art. 52; L. HENKIN ET AL., BASIC DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT TO INTERNALAW 113 (1987) [hereinafter HENKIN SUPPLEMENT].

TIONAL
119.
120.
121.

U.N. CHARTER art. 51,1 1-2.
See WASH. POST, supra note 55.
McDOUGAL, supra note 3, at 283.
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Identification is the process by which one comes to regard oneself as
part of an aggregate or group."1 ' Saddam Hussein has tried to identify
himself as the leader of the "Arab Nation," but has ignored recent history
of the region in doing so."2' The colonization of much of the Arab world
and the subsequent divisions of those lands into political states contradicts Hussein's claim of "one Arab Nation." The reality that the Arab
States have their own leaders with their own power bases and political
agendas flies in the face of Hussein's claims and explains why his moves
are labeled "naked aggression." The United States and the anti-Iraqi coalition states identify themselves as members of the United Nations, and
they are willing to work within the framework of its Charter. The United
Nations itself may be characterized as an organization within the world
community, dedicated to producing world order.
Expectations are realistic beliefs about the past and realistic forecasts
of the future. Realism is achieved through close correspondence with the
124
events, and described as a disinterested observer would report them.
Looking to the past, Hussein saw the United States and United Nations
agree to a stalemate in Korea; he saw the United States pull out of Viet
Nam in humiliation; and he saw the United States leave Lebanon in the
early 1980s to an emasculated United Nations force. As for his own abilities, Hussein expected a quick victory against Iran, but only fought to a
draw after eight years. He accepted huge losses in the war; he used children to man his front lines; he used chemical weapons with impunity; and
he returned the Shatt al-Arab opening to the Persian Gulf to Iran after
the war. 26 Despite these facts, Hussein claimed "victory." Hussein
projects that he again will be able to claim victory.1' 6
Sanctioning has been done historically in an unorganized process.27
Absent an overall governing body, or given only an ineffective shell such
as the League of Nations, or the United Nations for much of its history,
states have been forced to rely on ad hoc approaches to sanctioning violators of international law. The result has been an unorganized approach
exhibiting varying degrees of success.
122. Id. at 284.
123. TASK FORCE, supra note 17, at 9-12. He also chooses to ignore the historical claims
that Jews, Christians, and.others have to lands the Ba'athists consider Arab. Concurrent
with Hussein Ibn Ali's struggle to create an independent Arab nation, equally determined
Zionists were struggling to create a Jewish nation in the land of Palestine.
124. McDOUGAL, supra note 3, at 287.
125. William Safire quotes the Voice of America in calling the return of Shatt al-Arab an
act that "rendered meaningless the loss of hundred of thousands of Iraqi lives in a war
lasting eight years." See DAILY PROGREss, Nov. 17, 1990, at 4.
126. TASK FORCE, supra note 17, at 12-13.
127. McDOUGAL, supra note 3, at 296.
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The current objective is to organize sanctioning into a system. The
United Nations, with its "elaborate and complex structure with a multiplicity of organs and affiliated bodies," is a prime example of an organized sanctioning system.1 20 The character of the United Nations Security
Council has been described as, and its authority places it at the pinnacle
of, an authoritative process. The establishment of a Grievous Offender
Tribunal by the Security Council would fall squarely within the expectations of the world community.
Furthermore, the tribunal approach is both proportional and compatible. It is proportional in that it has a reasonable possibility of acting upon
the international environment. It is compatible because it complements
12
other elements of a comprehensive approach to international security. 9
Additionally, it gives effect to the asserted claims necessary for a functioning international law.130 And finally, it is a logical extension of the
nine principal approaches to controlling international violence, specifically the approach deterring violations of conflict management norms by
making their violation criminal acts demanding personal responsibility.",
The situation presented by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait presents the Tribunal with a paradigm case on which to "cut its teeth." It is difficult to
envision a better situation under which to initiate an organized sanctioning system.
A.

The Trial of President Bush

The base values used by the sanctioners are generically the same as are
available to the violator.13s It is this phenomenon that causes Iraq to
threaten President Bush with war crimes trials at the same time the
United States is discussing trying Saddam Hussein 138 At issue is what
means each has at its disposal to effect a particular outcome.
128.
129.

Id. at 301.
Id. at 22.

130. Id. at 28.
131. J.N. MOORE ET AL, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 364, at 47-48 (1990) [hereinafter NATIONAL SECUiTY LAW]. Those nine approaches are: (1) determining when it is permissible to

use force (the old "just war" analysis, or now, making a distinction between aggression and

defense); (2) given a use of force, determining what norms govern the conduct of hostilities;
(3) determining what obligations exist to pursue a negotiated settlement; (4) using conflict
management to encourage dispute resolution as an alternative; (5) deterring violation of
certain norms by establishing their violation as criminal acts for which there is personal
responsibility; (6) seeking control through collective security; (7) seeking arms control and
disarmament; (8) enhancing deterrence through a central strategic or political balance; and
(9) looking to national measures for control of use of forces and for conflict management. Id.
132. Id. at 302.

133. The day after the United States raised the issue of trying Hussein for war crimes,
Iraq responded by making the same threat about trying President Bush. The Iraqi reaction
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For Iraq, it may try Bush in absentia with little hope of ever obtaining
personal jurisdiction over him. In fact, two sites, Libya and Algeria, have
been mentioned as possible locations for an Iraqi-backed trial of President Bush. In the case of Libya, Muammar Qaddafi has talked of putting
President Bush on trial for war crimes, apparently as a diversionary tactic
designed to take attention away from Hussein.13 ' The purpose of the Algerian trial would also be to shift attention from Hussein to Bush, but the
interesting connection is that Algeria may play a vital role in a United
Nations-backed trial of Hussein.1 35 In any event, neither Libya nor Algeria has the means, nor is it likely they can accumulate the means collectively, to bring President Bush to "justice."
B.

The Trial of Saddam Hussein

The anti-Iraqi coalition desires to use the international forum the
United Nations provides to enforce what most of the world's people have
mutually agreed upon and understand."' Any United Nations attempt to
try Hussein would be an effort to supplement existing rules, and would be
in line with what the states of the United Nations would have agreed to
had they foreseen this problem. This course of action would be consistent
with the notion that aggression is against public policy, that it is something the international community simply will not tolerate.
What differentiates the values and effect of the two different trials
(Iraq's trial of Bush and the United Nations' trial of Hussein) is authority
itself. Expectations that the "community" will make certain decisions in
accordance with certain criteria and procedures gives authority to either
trial's sanction. Only when done in conformance with expectations and
following proper procedures does any trial become "a dynamic base of
effective power. 1' 37 While Iraq's trial of Bush would likely gain little international support, a United Nations forum indicting Hussein would
provide an open conscience for the world. By gathering and using the authority that the due process of law offers, a "base of effective power" may
emerge. It is for these reasons the world must make full use of the availafit the pattern they have used throughout the crisis, to react to United States initiatives
very quickly without in-depth consideration to the realities or ramifications. Telephone Interview with State Department Official (Dec. 6, 1990) (hereinafter State Dep't Interview].

134. Telephone Interview with Dep't of Defense Official (Dec. 6, 1990) [hereinafter DOD
Interview].
135. Id.
136. DOD Interview, supra note 134, State Dep't Interview, supra note 133. Both the

State Department and Department of Defense Officials considered a multi-lateral effort,
purposely down playing United States involvement, as the only realistic possibility for actually conducting a trial of Hussein.
137.

McDOUGAL, supra note 3, at 303.
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ble sanctioning institutions. The world should not let this opportunity
become another example of United Nations' inability to enforce
sanctions.15 0
C. Setting the Stage for Available Options
Strategies are courses of action for managing base values for the
achievement of policy objectives. There are four main strategies: diplomatic, ideological, economic, and military.'" Each strategy can be analyzed by examining prevention, deterrence, restoration, rehabilitation,
and reconstruction. An attempt at the edge of existing legal practices, but
in line with organized sanctions and under a proper authoritative decision
maker, would fit the various strategies nicely.
The diplomatic strategy is to influence agreement and project policy
among the ruling elite. The trial of Saddam Hussein for grievous offenses
would serve to bring about agreement among the ruling elite, especially
considering the overwhelmingly negative attitudes expressed by most of
the world. Ideologically, a trial would serve to influence attitudes of large
groups of the world's population against individuals who violate international law. Economically, the trial itself would not have to be excessive, as
evidence against Hussein seems to be abundant and accessible. The effect
of a trial would serve as notice to future potential violators that the production, conservation, distribution, and consumption of wealth processes
are certainly not enhanced by short-sighted violations of international
law. Militarily, a trial may prevent the application of violence that threatens millions of lives and the world economy.
Without, trying to analyze each of the five characteristics of each strategy, a general review of the characteristics reveals support for such a
course of action. First, prevention supports a trial because within the current framework, decision makers can be influenced to regard themselves
as better off by avoiding breaches of order.1 40 Further offenses may be
prevented by holding Hussein responsible now. Had the world reacted
strongly to his earlier use of gas against Iran or against the Kurds, his
138. Rudolf von Jhering, in

THE STRUGGLE

FOR LAW (1915), ascribes the development of

law itself to the persistence in human nature of the impulse to resent aggression, and maintains that one owes the duty to himself and to society never to permit a legal right to be

wantonly infringed; see also Morningstar v. Lafayette Hotel Co., 105 N.E. 656, 657 (N.Y.
1914). It is this attitude that should prevail in grievous violations of international law. The
failure to act against clear aggression could be argued as constituting custom or "state practice", just as an affirmative act could help entrench the Nuremberg precedent of trying
grievous offenders.

139. The following analysis is based on the author's adaptation of the McDougal-Lasswell Model, supra note 3.
140. McDoUGAL, supra note 3, at 345.
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power base may have eroded sufficiently to have precluded him from
striking Kuwait.
When the probability is high that breaches will occur, deterrence becomes essential. Hussein has shown repeated wrongful use of hostages
and forced removal of citizens from their homelands, as well as other
atrocities, so the probability remains high such acts will continue. An international trial would serve to deter further wrongdoing and would send
a strong message. Additionally, such a trial may well identify, clarify, and
publish to other world leaders the difference between aggression and selfdefense, which would have a deterrence effect elsewhere. 14' Without a distinguishable difference published to the world, international law will not
be able to stop aggression.
Once breaches have occurred, restoration is a "rolling back" of a destructive operation. Though it is unlikely a trial alone would roll back the
destruction done in Kuwait, it may provide an initial step or a foothold
for other developments. A finding of guilt would provide legal precedent
for claims and suits against Iraq.
Similarly, once damage has occurred but hostilities continue, the focus
should be on those who have suffered. A trial could provide the moral
encouragement to begin the healing process for many Kuwaitis. Finally,
reconstruction would support a trial because this is where fundamental
institutions are brought into harmony with the overriding goal. Certainly,
trial in a legitimately constituted court supported by most of the world's
governments would further bring the United Nations into the process of
providing world order.
"Outcomes" are the immediate results obtained by participants in
sanctioning activities.142 A number of positive results would be obtained
by striving for increased world order through the employment of personal
sanctions for violations of international law. Though the various embargoes and condemning resolutions indicate extreme displeasure with Iraq's
move on Kuwait, those efforts fail to drive home the personal responsibility to Iraq's leaders, the decision makers. By seeking personal accountability, sanctions would add an immediate accounting, with corresponding
evidence on specific charges, to the amorphous condemnations now existing against Iraq. Such accountability may serve as both a "wake up"
call to Iraqi leaders who have already violated international law, and as a
warning to those leaders who may do so in the future. Just as Churchill
141.

See G.A. Res. 3314, 29 GAOR Supp. 31 (A/9631) Dec. 14, 1974 "Definition of Ag-

gression" Resolution, Art. 5 (2). "A war of aggression is a crime against territorial peace.
Aggression gives rise to international responsibility." NATIONAL SECURiTY LAW, supra note
131, at 91-93.
142. McDoUGAL, supra note 3, at 333.
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said in World War II, warnings of eventual trials may reduce the brutality once the leadership realizes it is going to be defeated.14
Perhaps the best outcome of imposing personal sanctions early would
be that the sanctions would be defined, and have the support of a united
world community. One of the perpetual complaints of international law is
that it is uncertain, both in application and extent.144 A Security Council
tribunal, with authority to investigate grievous violations, would provide
consistency of application and the tribunal's sanctions would be uniform.
By employing the tribunal now, the sanctions would be in place, ready for
implementation once personal jurisdiction is obtained. The complications
that arise after the fact (for example, the Nazis after World War II, or
Noriega after Panama) would be severely reduced. The message would be
clear: The world stands as an international community condemning aggression. It would also show that the countries of the world intend to
abide by article 4 25 of the Charter and carry out the decisions of the Se1
curity Council.
"Effects" refer to long-term consequences upon the international
arena-that is, whether movement is made toward minimal world order. 146 That international law has suffered from widespread doubts about
its influence, relevance, or even existence has been discussed. 14" The desired result is stability, and a Grievous Offender Tribunal would increase
stability through the probability that international relations will be
peacefully managed."4 International law has long recognized that states
have the power to break a treaty, but not a right. And, when they do,
they must suffer the consequences. The effect of a personal responsibility
sanction would acknowledge one's power to violate international law, but
there is no right and no refuge. When one chooses to violate international
law, one must face the consequences.
Whether there has been effective means to impose United Nations
sanctions against an individual for violating the United Nations Charter
remains uncertain. Because the Security Council does not have a police
force, but rather relies on states to enforce its decisions, it is unlikely its
143. See F.M. Buscher, The U.S. War Crimes Trial Program in Germany.
144. "Realpolitic" misperceptions that there is no international law often occur because:
there is no "international legislature"; there is no "compulsory jurisdiction"; there is no
"sanction for violations"; law is only a "restraint system" and does not assist decision mak-

ers with complex national security decisions; international law is "vague and indeterminate"; the real world does not lend itself to morals and legality; and empirical observation
reveals law is simply not considered. RICHARD B. LILLICH & JOHN N. MOORE, 61 U.S. NAVAL
WAR COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES ix (1980).

145.

HENKIN SUPPLEMENT,

146.
147.
148.

McDOUGAL, supra note 3, at 333.

supra note 118, at 105.

NATIONAL SECURITY LAW,

Id. at 32.

supra note 131, at 26.
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decisions alone will resolve the dispute. About all that can be expected of
the Security Council is for it to continue reaching for ways to expand the
use of law, economics, and politics to advance world order. By aggressively seeking a new approach such as the tribunal proposed herein, the
Security Council would not have to rely on police powers, but can expect
the cooperation of States to enforce its decisions. In this way, it should
promote cosmos rather than chaos, settle patterns of behavior rather than
have unpredictability, and produce agreed rather than forced decisions. 14'9
D. The Grievous Offender Tribunal
Security Council Authority. The Security Council is international
in nature, it is a "party" to international conflict, and article 24 of the
United Nations Charter confers authority on the Security Council to
maintain peace and security. 1 ' Overall, it may be deduced that since articles 42 and 51 of the Charter give the Security Council power to "take at
any time such action as it deems necessary," including military operations, to restore international peace and security, conducting trials would
certainly fall within such a grant of authority."" However, such a wide
open interpretation is not necessary.
Articles 39 and 41 combine to make a convincing argument for authority to conduct trials. Article 39 states, "The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act
of aggression and shall make recommendations . . . .",' Article 41
states, "The Security Council may decide what measures not involving
the use of armed force are to be employed. . . ."153 A trial provides an
ideal means for determining the existence of threats to peace, breaches of
peace, acts of aggression, and other "crimes" established by the Nuernberg Principles."" Trials also are measures "not involving the use of
armed force." 1' Clearly, the Security Council possesses the authority to
conduct trials, and it has the authority to do so now!
Law consists of patterns of authority and patterns of control. The Security Council has authority and the Security Council should therefore
establish the Grievous Offender Tribunal as the decision maker. Control
exists only where decisions are backed by effective sanctions. Until now,
effective sanctions have been missing from efforts to establish world order
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id.

supra note 118, at 106.
Id.at 110, 112.
Id. at 110 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
See United States Government, TRIALS OF WAR
HENKIN SUPPLEMENT,

MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAw

155.

HENKIN SUPPLEMENT,

CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG

No. 10, Vol. IX (1950).

supra note 118, at 110.
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through the "rule of law." A Security Council Grievous Offender Tribunal, backed with military force to apprehend the offender, would create
the process and sanction needed to produce order through the "rule of
law." The Tribunal would alleviate the helplessness countries often experience in times of international conflict, it would be cloaked in the authority of law and international community ideals, it would promote a
sense of international community, it would educate the world (specifically
potential violators and heads of state) on the difference between self-defense and aggression, and it would renew attention to international
human rights. The Tribunal would combine the best efforts of the past
with a logical step to the future by using a power that already exists.
Initially, the Security Council should limit the scope of any tribunal to
the most grievous cases, those that involve true threats to world order.
The limited resources (people, money, and material) available to the
United Nations would be a practical limitation on the tribunal, and politically, the most grievous offenses would probably result in the least resistance. Also, other sanctions are available to settle disputes not arising to
threats to world order,16 and the Charter under article 51 does allow individual and collective self-defense until the Security Council affirma"
tively says "no.'11
Admittedly, conducting trials now would be a break from the past,
when the Security Council's function has not been to act as a watchdog
serving to adjudicate breaches of the peace.'" However, just because the
authority has not been used before does not mean it should not be tried.
The world is undergoing revolutionary changes, and organizations must
adapt with their own significant changes if they expect to continue exerting influence. Implementation of the Security Council offers another advantage: to, hold trials now would be to progress significantly from Nuremberg, where only the victors sat in judgment and the losers were the
defendants.
Such an argument contains a deontological appeal. There is a rule of
law, it is expected that it will be followed, and violators will be punished.
The international community will have conferred jurisdiction on the Tribunal. Also, by signing the United Nations Charter, states recognize the
scope of authority of the Security Council, and thereby they submit
themselves to its jurisdiction; so no compulsory jurisdiction problem
exists.
By exercising its authority in conducting trials, the Security Council
could forestall potentially dangerous actions on both sides of a conflict.
156. See NATIONAL SECURITY LAW, supra note 131, at 227 & 417.
157. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
158. NATIONAL SECURITY LAW, supra note 131, at 274.
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For Kuwaitis and other victims of Hussein's terror, war crime trials will
have little value except to prevent future harm. Retribution after the fact
is little solace to one of Hussein's victims. The initiation of war crime
trials may be argued as measures utilized by the Security Council to
maintain peace and security under article 51, and could be used to stall
military action. Ironically though, trials may provide the proper basis for
military action. If trials are conducted, and Hussein is convicted, then he
could be labeled officially as hostes humani generis (common enemy of
mankind), or more simply, an "outlaw." Members of the United Nations
could then take military steps to bring him to justice, much in the same
way posses had authority to act in past days of the American West.
The Framework. "The Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions." 1so
The purpose of implementing trial procedures would be to outlaw force as
a modality for aggression. To be effective, the jurisdictional principle of
universality must be applied,"" and states must accept and carry out the
decisions as required by article 25 of the United Nations Charter. 1s'
The Security Council should establish a tribunal similar to the International Military Tribunal used at Nuernberg. First, the Security Council
should adopt a charter, forming a Tribunal as was done at Nuernberg.
Naturally, the charter for such a tribunal would- provide fundamental
rights to the accused, such as the right to be present, procedural due process, and to defense counsel. As a practical matter, the tribunal charter
should also limit the tribunal to cases involving "grievous offenses."16
Second, a panel of judges should be selected. The selection of judges
could be a crucial element of the overall success of the Tribunal. Selecting
a group of judges who would represent a multi-lateral effort to impose the
rule of law is essential to the tribunal's success. Any perceptions of the
trial as a unilateral effort by the United States would severely weaken the
"authoritative" nature of the proceedings. For these reasons, the Tribunal
should be held outside the United States, even though the United States
is "home" to the United'Nations, and its members should be mostly-if
not entirely-from countries other than the United States.
A tribunal panel for the trial of Hussein could include judges from the
Soviet Union, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and perhaps Algeria.' s As for a site
159. U.N. CHARTER art. 29.
160. See NATIONAL SECURITY LAW, supra note 131, at 379; see also HENKIN, supra note 1,
at 824.
161. U.N. CHARTER art. 25.
162. "Grievous Offenses" are those "Grave Breaches" defined in the 1949 Geneva Conventions. See NATIONAL SECURITY LAW, supra note 131, at 376-77.
163. Algeria may play a key role in any talks or negotiations between Iraq and the West.
Abdel Massadeh notes that Algeria is respected in the Arab world, and is viewed as a "mod-
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for such a tribunal, the Gulf Cooperation Council should be consulted.'"
That any trial which may occur will be a political action, dictated by the
politics of the moment, is readily apparent. What is important is to recognize the framework in which a trial may develop, and wait for the appropriate time to select the actual participants.
The Nuremberg Principles provide sufficient framework to initiate the
trials, and the Nuremberg examples may be used for charging purposes.
Three main areas were used to cover the spectrum of crimes committed
by the participants of World War II: (1) crimes against peace (waging
aggression);"' (2) war crimes (grave breaches of the law of war); " and (3)
crimes against humanity. 7 Human rights violations, when amounting to
"grievous offenses," should be incorporated here.
Just as was done at Nuernberg, no immunity should be given for heads
of state or other government officials, and there should be no statute of
limitations.'" No consideration or theory should prevent the individual
from becoming the subject of international law if states, through the Sese
curity Council, so wish.

Naturally, the same ex post facto concerns that Nazi leaders raised
probably would be raised again.170 The descriptive phrase nullum crimen
sine lege, "without a law there is no crime," would be argued by lawyers
claiming there was not a "body of law" out there when the acts took
erate" Arab state by the West. Though Jordanian news reports indicated Algeria was the
likely spot for Iraqi-backed war crime trials of President Bush, there was no indication the
Algerian government was to be involved in running the proceedings. Interview with Abdel
Massadeh, Jordanian, supra note 18.
164. In talking with DOD and State Department and other government officials, the
whole area of war crimes trials was so speculative that few people have taken the time to
think through the realities of an actual trial. Though a file of evidence against Hussein is
being kept, there is frustration with getting the Administtiatoa to even accept the idea of a
trial. Now, the "box in" concern to diplomatic efforts prevents individuals from justifying
the time to explore how such a trial would be conducted.
165.

NATIONAL SECURITY LAW, supra note 131, at 370.

166. Id. at 378. The Geneva Conventions on the treatment of prisoners of war authorize
a belligerent state to try individual members of enemy forces who violate the provisions of
the Convention; they also require the state whose military authorities have committed these
violations to bring them to punishment. See HENKIN, supra note 1, at 359.
167.

NATIONAL SECuRrrY LAW, supra note 131, at 379.

168. HENKIN, supra note 1, at 149. The official position of defendants, whether as heads
of state, or responsible officials in Government departments, shall not be considered as freeing them from responsibility, or mitigating punishment. Though an individual cannot acquire territory, make treaties, or have belligerent rights under international law, he can
commit war crimes, piracy and crimes against humanity. See id. at 362 & 356.
169. Id. at.356.
170. Id. at 365; see also NATIONAL SEcuiITY LAW, supra note 131, at 369.
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place. 7 1 But, as the Nuernberg Court held, there is and has been law,
what has not been in existence is a court.1 2 The Nuernberg trials established that there must be a law against certain behavior to try an individual for such behavior, even if the only applicable law is customary international law. The prosecution need not have given notice regarding who
or what would enforce the law or execute punishment.'"7 In the present
case, the Security Council could partially overcome the last objection by
announcing now its intention of trying offenders when hostilities end.
Finally, the number of votes needed to convict, as well as any appellate
rights should be considered. The standard set by Nuremberg worked well,
and avoided the extensive criticism the Tokyo Trials received. 7 4 At Nuernberg, three out of four votes were required to convict and sentence. If
one judge from each of the previously suggested countries were to sit, a
similar procedure could be used here. On the other hand, considering the
development of the law since 1946-particularly ini light of much of the
world moving away from capital punishment-perhaps a larger panel (for
instance, twelve) with a requirement for a unanimous decision for death
sentences would be more appropriate. In the case of a larger panel, a minimum of two-thirds is suggested to convict and to sentence. If further
safeguards are desired, a three-fourths concurrence could be required on
sentences in excess of a certain term of years (for instance, ten). This is
the procedure used by the United States Military judicial system.
As for any appellate rights, the sole source would be the Security Council itself. Any finding by a Grievous Offender Tribunal established by the
Security Council should be considered final and binding, and appeals
should be limited to procedural errors or findings of new evidence. Since
the Grievous Offender Tribunal would derive its authority from the

171. J. Zogby, The Gulf Crisis and the Future of Arab-American Relations, J.B. Moore
Society Lecture, University of Virginia School of Law (Oct. 9, 1990). Of course, there is
contrary principle nullum crimen sine poena, no crime without a punishment.

172'

NUERNBERG TRIALS,

supra note 154, at 1448-49.

173. HENKIN, supra note 1, at 363-65.
174. The fairness of the Tokyo Trials was a subject of considerable concern. While the
Nuremberg defendants were read or served copies of their charges individually, the Tokyo
defendants were served as a group. While there were a range of verdicts and punishments at
Nuremberg, the Tokyo results were considerably more uniform-to the detriment of the
defendants. All appeals to General MacArthur were denied, and the process was extremely
fast. Then, the United States Supreme Court chose not to intervene on many of the cases
because the war crimes courts were initiated by an international effort and General MacArthur served as appellate authority in his role as Commander of the United Nations forces,
not in any role under United States jurisdiction. An example of the "due process" concern
was the appeal to General MacArthur by Defense Counsel Bruce Blakeney. Blakeney alleged, "In no case did the bare seven judge majority agree on a sentence. Death was voted
with as few as four votes out of eleven in support." See D. WELLS, WAR CRIMES AND LAWS OF
WAR 67, 75 (1984).
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United Nations Charter through the Security Council, no state alone
would have authority to overturn a ruling, conviction, or sentence. Administrative matters, such as where a sentence of confinement would be
served, or where a death penalty would be executed, should be resolved at
the time the Tribunal is initiated.
Charging Saddam Hussein. To assert that it is unjust to punish
those who in defiance of treaties and assurances have attacked neighboring states without warning is obviously invalid, for in such circumstances
the attacker must know that what he is doing is wrong. Aside from it
being unjust to punish him, it would be unjust if his wrong were allowed
to go unpunished. Charging Saddam Hussein would serve several causes.
First, it would formally put him on notice of the Security Council's intent
to hold him personally liable (as opposed to Iraq in general) for violations
of international law. At the same time, it would telegraph the same message to Hussein's "lieutenants" and other individuals throughout the
world that they, too, may be held accountable for their actions. Charging
would represent to Hussein a united effort by a representative body of
the world community to enforce personal sanctions against individuals
within Iraq, in addition to the economic and political sanctions being employed against the country. This sanction would force its intended subject
to defend himself in court, and the unique personal component
of the
' 175
sanction would act independent of the subject's "resiliency.
Hussein's record of international law violations is extensive. In keeping
with the political realities necessary to make a Security Council trial effective, those violations committed by Hussein which amounted to grave
breaches should be the focus of the charging. A partial list for which he
should be tried includes:" s (1) waging war of aggression against Kuwait; 7 (2) failure to comply with United Nations resolutions legally
binding against him between August 2 and November 29, 1990; (3) violating the 1949 Convention on Civilians (forcing civilians from occupied ter175. Hussein has indicated that the United States does not understand the resiliency of
the Iraqi people. This suggestion was intended to deflate the importance of economic embargoes by inferring that the Iraqis can cut back, ration goods, and disregard material wellbeing. Charging individuals with violations of international law places a personal component
upon sanctions that embargoes and condemnations fail to capture. See, e.g., Mark Fineman,
Iraq ParadesIts Defiance of U.N. Embargo, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1990, at Al.
176. J.N. Moore & R.F. Turner, Iraqi Aggression and the Future of World Order, a paper delivered in class lecture, University of Virginia School of Law (Fall 1990). For a draft

indictment against Saddam Hussein, see Ad Hoc United Nations Criminal Tribunal (plaintiffs) v. Saddam Hussein and the Military, Political and Economic Advisors of Iraq (defendants) submitted by the Commission for the International Due Process of Law to the Secretary General of the United Nations in October 1990.
177. See U.N.

CHARTER

art. 2, para. 4.
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ritory, and failure to prevent Iraqi military leaders from improperly caring for civilians within their control);178 (4) forced relocation of 500,000
ethnic Kurds and Syrians in late 1980's;179 (5) using civilians as shields
for military installations and targets;8 0 (6) threatening to let foreigners
starve unless food was sent without conditions;'$' (7) violating the 1961
Vienna Convention on Diplomats;8 2 (8) violating the 1973 Diplomatic
Convention on Crimes (to protect Diplomats);'" (9) violating the 1979
Convention on Hostage Taking;'" (10) threatening first use of chemical
weapons (1925 Geneva Protocol); 86 (11) threatening to mistreat downed
airmen;'$' (12) threatening to use missiles against civilians;"8 ' and (13)
poisoning water supplies. 88 Note that the list of offenses begins to resemble the catalog of offensives made by the World War I Commission,'" as
well as those crimes for which the Nuremberg Trials were conducted.
That similar war crime lists already exist (to which Saddam Hussein's
actions correlate substantially) serves to prove a long-standing existence
of international standards, of expectations of the world community, and
of the existence of international laws against such behavior prior to the
initiation of a Security Council court. These precedents should eliminate
ex post facto arguments.
Charging Saddam Hussein would also help in eliminating mixed signals
that have been sent to Hussein. A quick review of several substantial
moves or positions taken by various participants reveals the disparity in
messages being sent. Consider, the firing of General Dugan, the Air Force
Chief of Staff, for his statements that the United States would target
Saddam Hussein, his family, and Baghdad."90 Though Secretary of Defense Cheney was entirely proper in firing General Dugan, the message
sent to Saddam Hussein was that United States military leaders should
178. See John F. Burns, Confrontation in the Gulf: From An Old Iraqi Battlefield,
Warning of New Bloodshed, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1990, at 1.
179. See Michael Wines, Confrontationin the Gulf: U.S. Aid Helped Hussein's Climb;
Now, Critics Say, The Bill is Due, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1990, at Al.

180. See John F. Burns, Confrontation in the Gulf: Iraqi Backs off Its Threat to Execute Diplomats Who Hide Civilians, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 28, 1990, at A6.
181. See Paul Lewis, U.N. Council Votes Strict Limits on Food Aid to Iraq and Kuwait,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1990, at Al; Iraq Swings Wild and Low, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1990, §
I at 22.
182. Moore & Turner, supra note 176.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. See WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 1990, at 27,
189. NATIONAL SECURITY LAW, supra note 131, at 364-66.
190. DAILY PROGRESS, Sept. 17, 1990, at 1.
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not make such plans, that such plans are inappropriate, and that the
United States may have legal or other problems with making an attack
with those objectives in mind. Correct or not, those assumptions may
have served to bolster Hussein's position with his own military. At about
the same time, the President of France said that all Hussein needed to do
was indicate a will to get out, and a negotiated settlement would be possible."' Shortly thereafter, President Bush conceded a solution to the Crisis may be tied to Israel and the Middle East."'
Then, the United States Congress and the press began making an issue
of the necessity for the President to seek permission from Congress
before beginning offensive operations. That criticism, of course, paralleled
the plea from other states that the United States must act through the
United Nations in any offensive military strike. The Soviet Union went so
far as to say the United States "must never resort to force," 198 All of
these messages can be interpreted as signs of weakness, and Saddam Hussein's comments to a British reporter on November 11, 1990, indicate that
is just how he chose to interpret the situation. What is important is Hussein's perception of the message, not the sender's intention.'" The charging and subsequent trial of Saddam Hussein would send an unequivocal
message to him, Iraq, and the rest of the world.
Similarly, Hussein's trial and likely conviction would provide consequences beyond the obvious personal dilemma that it would cause Hussein. First, it would impose a duty on any nation to which Hussein may
flee or travel to imprison or extradite him. The mandatory language of
article 25 of the United Nations Charter'" is similar to Article 10 of the
Maritime Convention with its "shall" prosecute or extradite provision."'
This requirement imposes upon states a duty to apprehend a violator if
found in their country. s9 Such an imposition would serve to bind the
member States to the spirit of the United Nations Charter.
191. George Will complains the Bush Administration is sending "a garbled message."
See DAILY PROGRESS, Nov. 8, 1990. President Bush has now retreated from the "linkage"
issue, perhaps to simplify the negotiations over getting Iraq out of Kuwait. See CNN Headlines News, television broadcast, Dec. 6, 1990.
192. Id.
193. Martin Indyk, President of Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Lecture,
University of Virginia School of Law (1991). At the conclusion of Baker's trip to the Soviet
Union in early November, however, the Soviets agreed not to block a United States resolution to authorize force. See Andrew Rosenthal, Mideast Tensions: Buildup in Gulf Seen as
a Signal on Use of Force, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1990, at 1, col. 5.
194. The effectiveness of any sanctions "depend on his ability to receive the message. It
is his perception that is important." Martin Indyk, President of the Washington Institute
for Near East Policy, supra note 193.
195. U.N. CHARTER art. 25.
196. MARITIME CONVENTION art. 10.
197. Telephone Interview with State Department Official, Sept. 17, 1990.
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Furthermore, a trial would combat his whirlwind of propaganda. Hussein has received undue media attention because of: (a) hostage taking;
(b) claims that Kuwait is historically part of Iraq; (c) his putting Bush on
trial for war crimes; (d) claims of United States imperialism; (e) claims
that he is the liberator of Palestine; and (f) his "Robin Hood" image that
he is protecting the poor by redistributing excessive Kuwaiti wealth. A
trial would serve to educate the world about the difference between selfdefense and aggression. It would also keep the "rule of law" at the forefront of world opinion, and reinforce expectations that disputes be resolved in a civil manner.
A judgement by an international tribunal condemning Hussein's actions and tactics may inspire a coup, force him to retire, or restrict his
travel thereby limiting his ability to find support. As long as Hussein
thinks he can possibly win friends in the international community, he will
delay. On November 11, 1990, Saddam Hussein met with a Chinese envoy
with the hope that he could convince the Chinese to veto a Security
Council resolution authorizing military action.19" Though Hussein was not
completely successful because China abstained on the use of force resolution, the meeting represented his continued hope. Until the world acts
decisively in a manner that does not provide Hussein hope of chiseling
away at the coalition, he will rely on hope and keep stalling for time. Two
options offer the decisiveness needed: A military strike and an international judicial decision. The available diplomatic efforts and resolutions
provide loopholes and differing degrees of enforcement that "turn the ball
back over to Hussein" to carry as he sees fit.
Alternatives to Immediate Trial. While a number of leaders have
gone on record supporting criminal trials of Hussein and his accomplices,
some experts have expressed concern with such an approach. 1 " Recogniz198. U.S. News & World Report OR Washington Post Nov. 17, 1990.
199. Among those people strongly advocating trial of Saddam Hussein are Margaret
Thatcher (see Alison Smith, Thatcher Warns Saddam of War Crimes Trial, FIN. TIMES,
Sept. 3, 1990, at 1), and George Shultz. See Va. Public Television, television broadcast Oct.
29, 1990 [taped Oct. 12, 1990]. The Bush Administration has mentioned the idea and begun
cataloging alleged violations. See John M. Broder & Robin Wright, U.S. Building War
Crimes Case Against Hussein, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1990, at Al col. 4; DAILY PROGRESS, Oct.

16, 1990, at 1. Similarly, on Sept. 12, 1990, in testimony before the House Foreign Affairs
Committee in response to a question about establishing a criminal court with Saddam Hussein as a likely suspect, Under Secretary Kimmitt of the State Department stated that considerable legal talent within the Government was working on the "complex legal issues in
this regard." Hearings on United States Policy Toward Cambodia: Prospects for a Negotiated Settlement Before the House Foreign Affairs Comm., 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1990).
During the C-SPAN television broadcast on the Middle East, most speakers opposed the
idea. See supra note 34. Razi called it counterproductive, as he thought it would back Hussein into a corner with no way out. Rothman said if Hussein "has to lose, everybody loses."
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ing the political, logistical, and practical difficulties of establishing a
Grievous Offender Trial, alternatives should be explored that may accomplish partial objectives on the road to order and establishing the "rule of
law."
At a minimum, the Security Council should pass a resolution adopting
a charter that establishes a tribunal and declares the Council's intent to
prosecute grievous offenders. The tribunal could become the focal point
for gathering evidence against offenders. Because memories fade, people
die, and evidence is destroyed, the sooner a responsible body begins taking depositions, collecting evidence, tracking witnesses and so forth, the
stronger the prosecution will be. Such a move will still send a strong message, and will avoid the in personam problem which an immediate trial
would present.
A second alternative to an immediate trial would be a bifurcated investigation initiated to determine facts. As with the first alternative, the
function of capturing the moment, preserving evidence, and making factual determinations may prove invaluable at a later date. Though without
the authority to make findings of guilt in a criminal sense, a prosecutor
could later use the investigation's findings, to establish an offender's guilt.
Such an investigation might begin with the apparently elementary question of whether aggression did occur. The investigation may delineate the
difference between state aggression, which, although perhaps contrary to
international law, may not necessarily result in personal culpability by a
leader and individual aggression, whereby a leader should stand accountable and face criminal liability for his decisions and actions.2 00 Finally, a
That is, Hussein will unleash his arsenal with disregard for who is hurt. George thought a
trial would push too far, and Hussein should be left an exit; the West should show a willingness to listen. Post advocated people think beyond the present crisis, and a trial might not
be the best solution. See supra note 34.
Beyond the immediate crisis, there are substantial concerns with the Grievous Offender
Tribunal approach. Foremost is the precedent such a trial would set where it could be used
against all nations. Examples where such a trial may have been sought by some countries of
the world are: (1) The United States in Grenada, Libya, and Panama; (2) The Soviet Union
in Afghanistan; and (3) Israel in Iraq and Lebanon. Though having the Security Council
conduct the trial would remove the inequities that have prevailed in the General Assembly
for years, an unfair perception (that "might makes right") may certainly arise among the
Third World.
200. One such distinction may be the finding of legitimacy (versus tyranny) of the
leader's control. Using the McDougal-Lasswell model, if the leader's control is derived from
an authoritative process, then deference may be given to his role as "head of state." If,
however, the control is effective control outside the rule of law, then the leader's actions
should be judged as any private individual would be judged.
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later hearing might establish criminal liability, impose sanctions, or take
other corrective measures as necessary.
Advantages of Proceeding with Trial. Proceeding with trial
would produce a number of advantages, because the "rule of law" would
help fashion policy. By taking action on the "rule of law," an entirely new
dynamism takes effect. The need to base action on established national
objectives disappears as United Nations objectives prevail 01 When the
United Nations announces what the world wants to hear-that the
United Nations can and will take action-national policy will usually become subsumed by that of the United Nations.
By taking action in accordance with the "rule of law," the United Nations will serve its own best interests because the decisional performance
of an institution affects the respect and influence of that institution."' 2 In
other words, by making decisions that are authoritative and effective, an
institution increases its own stature. The institution gains respect, increasing the likelihood that in the future others will turn to it for authoritative and effective decisions in other difficult situations. 0 8
By using the judicial process, the United Nations would also place a
timetable on Saddam Hussein, regardless of the nebulous embargoes and
malleable diplomatic ultimatums. A trial progresses at the discretion of
the fact finder, and such a proceeding would serve as a "punctuation
point" in an analytical approach in which steps reinforce each other. 2 4'
Until now, world order has been an elusive ideal, but institutions like
the United Nations stand as evidence of man's continued pursuit of that
ideal. To make the seemingly unattainable a reality, the United Nations
and other world organizations need to use every tool at their disposal,
expand currently accepted practices, and create new approaches to accomplish their objectives. Law exists as a key ingredient to the authoritative process, and proceeding with trial would provide a legitimate context
for effective action.
Specifically, the establishment of a Grievous Offender Tribunal would
be a logical progressive step in the development of the international law
201. The muddling of issues that the United States has experienced becomes irrelevant.
Whether the United States deploys to defend Saudi Arabia, to stop aggression, or to maintain a cheap supply of oil is not germane to apprehending criminals under authority of the
United Nations.
202. NATIONAL SEcuRrTY LAW, see supra note 131, at 25.
203. "Success breeds success." If the United Nations plays a pivotal role in solving the
Gulf crisis, such success will have beneficial ramifications for other disputes. Chris Hodges,
Confrontation in the Gulf: At the U.N. Many Issuei Are Called, but Only One is Chosen:
PersianGulf, N.Y. TIMES Sept. 27, 1990, at 11, col. 1.
204. The idea is taken from Harold Saunders but this is not his approach. Saunders feels
a trial would eliminate diplomatic options. Saunders, supra note 34.
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of conflict management. Furthermore, an established tribunal would be in
conformance with community expectations about proper decision and
proper decision makers, as distinguished from decisions based on mere
naked power.20 5 The tribunal would combine political legitimacy with social consequences, thereby producing a positive impact on the international law society. The tribunal would also impose a personal, direct sanction on responsible individuals, supported by real, tangible enforcement.
The personal nature of a trial should serve as a deterrent factor, if not for
Hussein, then for other violators of international law. Of utmost importance would be the effort to enforce sanctions, for without such effort,
there is little reason for one to conform to society's expectations. One can
expect international law to be considered "law" only so long as it controls
20
behavior.
IX.

CONCLUSION

Law is the continued pursuit of:
the shining but never completely attainable ideal of the rule of law above
men .... If that ideal be an illusion, to dispel it would cause men to
lose themselves in an even greater illusion, the illusion that personal
power can be benevolently exercised. Unattainable ideals have far more
influence in molding human institutions toward what we want them to be
than any practical plan for the distribution of goods and services by executive fiat.207
Though the concept of a rule of law which governs above men remains
a shining ideal, man has made significant strides toward achieving that
goal, and man's pursuit of that ideal has indeed molded institutions. The
"rule of law" arose from a concept of legitimacy, wherein laws had to
meet the criteria of being both effective and authoritative. Totalitarian
regimes, though effective, were not accepted as authoritative like democratically elected governments adhering to a rule of law, and institutions
such as the League of Nations and the United Nations were created as
efforts by men to achieve supremacy of the "rule of law."
The Nuernberg Trials established the practice of holding individuals
personally liable for war crimes.208 Personal accountability for violations
of human rights arose from the atrocities of World War II and has pervaded institutions, governments, and courts worldwide. What were once
"unattainable ideals" are, today, commonly accepted doctrines-or at
205.
206.

Moore & Turner, supra note 176.
NATIONAL SEcuRITY LAw, supra note 131, at 25.

207.

Thurman Arnold, Professor Hlart's Theology, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1298, 1311 (1960).
NUERNBERG TRIALS, supra note 154, at 1448-49.

208.
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least vigorously sought doctrines-throughout much of the world. By institutionalizing the concepts via the United Nations or other international organizations, the rules become more than just intellectual constructs, they become socially effective. In other words, the rules are
legitimized by first being made and communicated, then the international
organizations administer, interpret, enforce, adapt, and protect the
rules.2 9 Most likely, there will be even more reliance on institutions such
as the United Nations.
The Grievous Offender Tribunal as an alternative should be implemented on two bases. First, the tribunal is within the "rule of law" and
would serve as a punctuation point that may lead to a resolution short of
war. Second, if war is necessary, the tribunal could provide a legal basis
for military intervention that avoids exploitable or questionable justifications by individual States.
By drawing from the trends and projections suggested above, the
Grievous Offender Tribunal analysis answers the question set out in this
Article: Who or what in the world today is best situated to make authoritative decisions and to identify the types of issues upon which the decision maker should act? Hussein's invasion of Kuwait presented a model
case for answering those two questions.
Clearly, the United Nations Security Council is the organization best
situated, properly constituted, and sufficiently possessed of authority to
act as decision maker. As for the types of issues upon which it should act,
the grievous violations of international law, especially the naked aggression in violation of an explicit treaty and the spirit of the United Nations
Charter, are proper grounds for Security Council action. Hussein's invasion of Kuwait is ideal turf for implementing a new system because the
violator is known, the crimes are horrendous, and nothing less than world
order is at stake. By starting with the most egregious of cases, the Security Council can eliminate concern regarding whether and how it should be
involved, and can use the opportunity to set precedent. The Nuremberg
Trials provide an example of how the Security Council might accomplish
such a task. In that situation, once the trials were held, the idea of war
crime trials was accepted and the principles derived from the trials became customary international law.
Now is the time to expand the use of law, to move away from victor's
justice, and to try violators in an international forum as evidence arises.
The Security Council mechanisms contain the political realities (for example, major powers' veto authority) to make such trials and the resulting sanctions workable in today's world. By implementing a Grievous Offender Tribunal, the United Nations would move closer to the
209.

See BULL, supra note 4, at 56.
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unattainable ideal of the rule of law above man. The world must capture
the moment and act now.
X.

1991 POSTSCRIPT

The year following the development of this Article has truly been a
"banner year. 210 The Gulf War, the failed Soviet coup, the fall of communism, and the announcement of the destruction of tactical nuclear
weapons are now history. Though the news has been good for the most
part, the tumultuous times have caused many people to encounter difficulty in placing the events into an overarching perspective. Just what the
"new world order" is and where it is leading has caused considerable
anxiety.
XI.

TRENDS FOR THE FUTURE

A number of trends have become apparent throughout this last year,
and a look at their directions-even though they are quite diverse-is

useful to this Article."' The LEGAL Mix VII study conducted this year at
the Field Artillery School in Fort Sill, Oklahoma, identified four basic
political, socio-economic trends that propel us into the future.212 The
study uses Alvin Tofflier's technique of identifying prevalent trends, pro-

jecting them into the future, and then synthesizing the net effect of the
multiple interactive trends onto our collective future world. The trends
are balkanization, the move toward market economies and democracy,

global interdependence, and the information explosion.
210. The phrase "banner year" derives from the banner headlines that extend the full
length of the six columns on major newspapers. The most banners in a previous year was
fifteen, while the dramatic events of this year resulted in over 30 in the first nine months of
1991. WCYK radio broadcast, Charlottesville, VA, Sept. 25, 1991.
211. The trends are taken from three main sources. The first two'sources are renowned
authors, Alvin Toffler and Richard Simpkin, who have been analyzing the undercurrents in
world politics, particularly the way states confront one another, for years. The third source
is the LEGAL Mix VII study being conducted at the home of the Field Artillery in Fort Sill,
Oklahoma. Assigned the task of formulating the force, structure and equipment for the artillery of the future, this study includes extensive work in indentifying the threat, tracking
on-going trends, and projecting solutions for the future. All three sources have undertaken
the task of capturing the essence of recent momentous occurrences, and their conclusions
offer strong support for the conclusions drawn here.
212. See id. The far reaching nature of such a study is recognized when one considers it
was the Legal Mix V study conducted in the late 1970s that controlled how large portions of
the Gulf War were fought in 1991. LEGAL Mix VII is shaping forces and doctrine that will be
applicable for perhaps decades into the twenty-first century.
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Balkanization

"The likelihood of low-technology conflict increases with balkanization
....,, Modern balkanization represents the tendency for people to
identify with, demand recognition, and place political demands via a
group with which they freely associate. This trend is prevalent throughout the world; from ethnic groups, including Kurds, Croats, Sieks,
Catholics in Northern Ireland, Basque Nationalists, and French-Canadians in Quebec to special interest groups such as farmers in Japan,
winemakers in the European Economic Community, and ecology groups
in America. At one time this trend was closely associated with and often
mistaken for nationalism.
B. Market Economies and Democracy
Those political entities who resist the trend to market economies and
democracy condemn their people to backwardness and their military
forces to eventual obsolescence in an increasingly technical world. The
drive toward market economies is the result of a realization that they are
the best means of continually improving the quality of life for the most
people. Market economies are a powerful force for political change.2 1 '
Free markets beget free political institutions (democracy) which, in turn,
beget individual and human rights. Labor is a commodity, and in a free
market the labor force must flow freely to conform to the laws of supply
and demand. A free labor force demands free political institutions to protect individual rights.
C.

Global Interdependence

Participation in the global market economy will be the only way for
governments to meet the growing needs and expectations of their people.21" Global interdependence grows from the spread of market economies. As different people realize their comparative advantage relative to
the remainder of the world, they tend to provide some good or service
that they are better at producing than others. The growing linkages that
develop between different economies produce a global market economy.
Each entity becomes more dependent on others within the global economy. Each entity has a growing stake in the others' good fortune and also
stands to lose in the others' misfortune.
213. See LEGAL MIx VII, supra note 211.
214. National Security Strategy, 1988.
215. Id.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

608

[Vol. 43,

D. Information Explosion
"Information-based" economies out-perform others at an ever-increasing rate?26 The fourth trend, the information explosion, is the premier
trend. It ties the other trends together and magnifies their impact on the
world. The information explosion has transformed entire market economies. Some modern economies deal primarily in the production and dissemination of information and related services. The information explosion has divorced balkanization from nationalism. Groups of people can
now associate with each other freely and frequently across zip codes, state
boundaries, national borders, and oceans, whereas previously they could
only associate with those with whom they came in physical contact.
Global interdependence is facilitated by instantaneous global
communications.
E. The Role of Law in the Trends of the Future
Naturally, the law has much to do with each of the trends individually.
With balkanization, the rights of individuals as well as the sovereignty of
governments are addressed by legal documents and concepts. Market
economies are enhanced when corporations, investors, and private individuals can all rely on commercial codes, established procedures, and judicially enforced remedies to contractual obligations.
Global interdependence calls for common understanding and agreements in dealings between people, businesses, and governments-law establishes procedures upon which such common ground may be found. Finally, the information explosion would not expand as rapidly without the
safeguards law affords to patents, profit sharing, and the other necessary
characteristics of investment.
Law plays perhaps a bigger role in the overall process, a process which
is best understood through analogy. The changes in the world today are
so enormous and fundamental that the analogy of a nuclear reactor may
best represent the dynamics of what is at stake. The world can be viewed
as the power plant, while the changes over the last year or so can be
viewed as the active components within the walls of the reactor.
If the active components are brought together rapidly, or are not kept
in check, an explosion or meltdown may occur. If brought together within
the confines of a properly functioning nuclear reactor, the same material
that wreaks havoc and unparalleled destruction in one setting now provides the constructive power to light cities for years. The difference of
these outcomes is in the control of the nuclear chain reaction.
216.

Id.
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Just as lead rods are used to soak up excess neutrons in nuclear chain
reactions to control the rate of reaction, so must "lead rods" be in place
to soak up the excess energy generated when revolutionary change occurs
is
as a result of the four trends propelling the world into the future. Law 17
one such "lead rod" that needs to be in place to prevent a meltdown.'
By encouraging people to use established procedures, to work through
existing institutions, and to remain within the "rule of law," the change
that occurs will be both constructive and legitimate.2" The dual purpose
of law-proscribing what is to be done on the one hand and establishing
the structure or process on the other-is a concept that should now be
explored in the context of adding to deterrence.
F. Law's Role in Adding to Deterrence
Select nation-states ruled by tyrants are the potential enemies of the
global market economy and the four trends propelling the world toward
the future."' Nation-states have the legal means, as nations, to wage war,
while individuals who engage in warlike behavior are bandits, pirates, or
common criminals. When individuals control nation-states and act
outside their authority, using the resources of the state to their own selfish ends, they become tyrants. Law needs to provide the means to deter
tyrants from disrupting world order.
Tyrants can either conform to, withdraw from, or lash out at the trends
that threaten the positions of power they have usurped. Those nations
apt to lash out in response to the prevalent trends are the enemies upon
which both legal efforts and warfighting efforts must be focused. Creating
a legal structure that deters tyrants from acting, including for example,
regional agreements, coalitions, and embargoes, is logically the best avenue to take. However, the best practical method for deterring tyrants'
217. The response to explosive political change is too often reactionary, amounting to an
attempt to "put the genie back into the bottle." Reformations are often followed by
counter-reformations, leaving the masses in worse shape than had no reformation occurred.
The Hungarian invasion (1956) and Czech invasion (1968) are good modern examples, as is
Tiananmen Square. Without a strong, functional deterrent in place to stifle the aggressions
of tyrants, the masses will respond to traumatic change by doing anything within their
means to derail the trends that threaten their very existence.
218. The United States' handling of the recognition of the Balkan States is a prime example of this concept. Had the United States acted hastily, it could have incited violence in
the Balkan Republics, or perhaps worse, been blamed for inciting what was eventually the
Soviet coup attempt. Similarly, though the United States has been criticized for not readily
supporting those seeking independence within Yugoslavia, to have done so may have incited
breakdowns in order not only there, but elsewhere in the world.
219. The assumption is made that since "peace is breaking out all over," a global market
economy and its natural consequences (free labor force, free exhange of information and
ideas, etc.) are desirable.
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warmaking ventures is to establish a warfighting effort capable of utterly
destroying these potential adversaries. By isolating and caging the tyrants, their warmaking means become increasingly irrelevant in a world
that turns over technologically at an ever-increasing rate. 220 Thus, law
serves on two echelons: First, it proscribes what can and cannot be done;
second, it establishes a framework within which legitimate actors can operate to militarily destroy a tyrant who threatens world stability.
G. Law in "Third Wave" Warfare
[Als a precondition of political and moral acceptability, armies will employ force only in discrete amounts and for specific, achievable purposes,
with commanders held accountable for needless collateral damage; force
will constitute only one venue among many that states will employ to
achieve their aims, with military means integrated with and even
subordinate to these other means .... 221

Alvin and Heidi Toffler assert that the Gulf War initiated "Third

Wave" warfare..2 2 The technological advances produced by Third Wave

information-based systems have caused revolutionary changes in military
doctrine, and such technological advances, combined with the trends assessment given
earlier, demand a reconsideration of the accompanying le2
gal doctrine.

23

220. Technology used to turn over every fifteen to twenty-five years. Today, the computer technology and information explosion has reduced that period to about seven years. If
the world can find ways to deter a tyrant for just seven years, and keep him from obtaining
the latest technology during that time, his war-making capability will almost assuredly be
out of date and essentially worthless!
221. A.J. Bacevich, New Rules: Modern War and Military Professionalism,20 PARAMETERs: U.S. ARMY WAR C.Q. 12, 22 (Dec. 1990).
222. Alvin Toffler & Heidi Toffier, War, Wealth and a New Era in History, WORLD
MONITOR, May 1991, at 46. The Toiers assert that the First Wave of warfare arose out of
the agricultural revolution ten thousand years ago. First Wave warfare mirrored the agrarian lifestyles, thereby featuring hand-held and hand-made weapons. Fighting was close-in,
done face to face, and weapons such as the pike, sword, axes and battering rams depended
on human muscle power.
The industrial revolution, starting in the late 1600s, launched the Second Wave. The concept of mass dominated the Second Wave, and machines replaced human muscle power.
Mass production (featuring interchangeable parts), mass conscription, mass education, mass
communication, and mass firepower produced the desired result of mass destruction. The
atomic weapons that ended World War II epitomized Second Wave technology and thinking, as mass destruction became the central theme in military doctrine.
The Third Wave of warfare is now mutating in parallel with developments in society. As
mass production is giving way to customized production, so is mass destruction giving way
to smart weaponry that selectively destroys its targets. The Gulf War demonstrated the vast
superiority of a Third Wave system over a Second Wave machine. Id.
223. Directly on point is the work of Richard Simpkin. RICHARD E. SIMPKIN, RACE TO THE
Swirr (1985).
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H. Keeping Law Abreast of Current Technological Advances
Though weapons of mass destruction (products of Second Wave capabilities and mentality) will probably always remain a part of warfare, future conflicts will be decided based on surgical strikes.224 The Gulf War
demonstrated the ability of a Third Wave army to put a smart bomb
through an air shaft or an open window. The targets of the future will be
the command and control centers, which, as a practical matter, translate
into particular individual enemies. This is where law comes into play.
Current United States doctrine, formulated in response to world opinion, outlaws the targeting of specific individuals. 2 '5 Given technological
advances that have revolutionized the theory of how to fight wars, legal
doctrine must advance to permit the use of the technology for the good of
people and world order. Rather than allow tyrants to legally kill 100,000
soldiers who are but their pawns, while others (neutrals) are prevented
from targeting the true cancer, the time has come to turn the tables on
those who hide behind the law with impunity. The law should allow
targeting of individuals who plan and wage aggressive wars.22
The logical progression from this scenario is that if Security Council
action allows the leadership to be attacked in war, the Council certainly
has the authority, even the duty, to prosecute those individuals,
using, if
2 27
possible, procedural due process in a judicial setting.
L Keeping the Law Abreast of Current Doctrine
"Irregular operations of every kind constitute the most likely form of
future armed conflict; they should be understood and acknowledged for
what they are-a way of war!' 22 s A fundamental direction of future conflict is toward manuever or "leverage" warfare, as opposed to attrition
warfare.

29

The adherent of the manuever theory of warfighting focuses

224. The measure of effectiveness for Third Wave forces is the time spent in conflict.
Political will, the manuevering before contact, and the fragile nature of Third Wave forces

demand they execute and end conflicts rapidly.
225. Exec. Order No. 12,333 3 C.F.R. 200, 213 (1982 Comp.), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. §
401 at part 2.11 (1991).
226. Though it is recognized that the Law of War does not prohibit the targeting of
individuals who wage aggressive wars, the widespread belief that such action is unlawful
must change to acknowledge the benefit of targeting specific heads of state.
227. Robert F. Turner, Don't Let Saddam Escape Without Trial, ATLANTA J./ATLANTA
CONST., Aug. 31, 1991, at 21, col. 1.
228. SIMPKIN, supra note 223, at 321.
229. The trend is not new-it is simply a modern twist on Sun Tzu's "know the enemy"
theme advanced approximately 3000 years ago. What the Gulf War has brought to light is

that the information age pushes warfare further and further away from the attrition mentality through which armies square off against one another. By knowing the enemy and lever-
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on destroying the enemy's warmaking psyche, minimizing the enemy's
ability to resist by exploiting his weaknesses, maximizing one's own capabilities, and seizing and maintaining the initiative.2 30 To the statesman,
leverage warfare includes the spectrum of initiatives from economic actions (for example, erecting trade barriers, withdrawing aid, and imposing
sanctions) to political and diplomatic maneuvers, to quasi-military sanctions such as security assistance programs, shows of force, and joint training exercises with neighboring countries.
One arrow in the quiver of weapons that should not be ignored is the
use of law. Placing a tyrant on trial, complete with inscrutable fairness
and due process, is consistent wipi leverage warfare. This is precisely the
same conclusion that Richard Simpkin reached at the end of Race to the
Swift. 8 1 Simpkin cited the once successful doctrine of declaring someone
an outlaw.3 Such an action met the perpetrator on his own grounds.
First, it caused him to be put in "the same legal status as hostile combatants at war with the outlawing state."' 3 3 Second, it gave people certain
rights in dealing with the individual, and allowed the state to employ everything from "revolutionary warfare techniques to unrestrained action by
organized forces." 2 "' Again, the dual nature of law in proscribing what is
and is not proper, and establishing a process by which the community at
large may engage those who do not conform, is evident.
Though the trends identified by LEGAL Mix VII 2 5 are interesting in
and of themselves, and each trend to a large degree includes a role for law
to play, it is the conclusions that can be drawn from the trends that provide insights to the "rule of law" as it relates to the overall process. First,
all of the trends are favorable to ideals for which the United States and
aging strengths, one gains such superior positional advantage that wars are often won without even fighting.
230. By "maneuver" the author means to obtain such a superior positional advantage
that the outcome of any battle will likely be a foregone conclusion. In maneuver warfare the
target is the enemy's warmaking psyche. If that psyche is primarily built around a warmaking machine, as is often the case with tyrants, then the defeat of such armies closely parallels attrition warfare.
231. Simpkin states that the United States must begin seeing future war for what it is. It
will rarely be declared. Our foes will seldom give us the time or the catalyst to respond with
all our military might. Engagements and wars will be fought and decided without the ire of
the public ever being raised. Our ability to respond to these lightning conflicts or showdowns cannot be caged within the historical framework of "war" as the western world has
come to know it. The legal definition of war must be expanded to meet the dynamic reality
of that phenomenon. SIMPKIN, supra note 223, at 320. Numerous authors warn of western
traditions that severely limit the United States ability to play the world power game.
232. Id. at 321.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. See LEGAL Mix VII, supra note 211.
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the United Nations stand.2 3 In other words, all the trends are favorable
provided they occur at a rate of speed that allows the economies, the governments, the institutions, and other factors to adapt to the changing circumstances. The "rule of law" plays an extremely important role in maintaining control over the changing process.
Second, as countries cross the threshold into the democratic, market
economy, interdependent, information based arena, they become much
less likely to adopt a foreign policy based on aggression23 7 Subsequently,
they become less of a threat to the world, and instead, join the community of nations interested in maintaining world order. The conclusion
then, is that the threats in today's world are the industrial, mid-technology regimes that are inclined to lash out rather than conform to existing
world norms. The "rule of law" should be employed to deter such actors
from threatening world stability.
J. Saddam Hussein and the "Rule of Law" in the Future
Saddam Hussein remains in power today, and has yet to answer for his
actions. The need to hold him accountable is more important than ever.
Though the "rule of law" has made progress over time, it has been exof a rapidly changing world in the last
ceedingly slow in staying abreast
3
half of the twentieth century. e

There have not been war crime trials for individuals planning or waging
aggressive wars since the 1940s; yet every decade since has seen innocent
people die from such aggression. Just as crimes against peace arose from
the Second World War, and the body of human rights law grew from the
horrible atrocities committed during that time, now is the time to enlarge
the rule of law again.
The world has become educated on environmental issues and stands
ready to hold accountable those who wantonly destroy the environment.
In addition to the three crimes of World War II fame,239 eco-terrorism

should be added to the charge sheet against Hussein.
236. Among those ideals are freedom, respect for the individual, democracy, and human
rights.
237. R.J. Rummel, The Rule of Law: Towards Eliminating War and Democide (Oct. 10,
1991) (unpublished address delivered at University of Virginia, School of Law).
238. Consider, for example, that the laws of war were written for the European setting.
Certain basic foundations and assumptions were at play, such as a hostile enemy desirous of

fighting to the bitter end, yet possessing Judeo-Christian perspectives on life and death.
Coalition forces in the Gulf War confronted by overwhelming forces seeking not confrontation, but rather food, shelter, and protection from their own command, did not find the
current laws of war particularly helpful in describing Allied obligations to the prisoners.
239. Crimes against humanity, crimes against peace, and war crimes.
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Thus, law should be used aggressively in a variety of ways against Hussein. Law should be used the way the politics and morals of our age dictate, growing in accordance with technology, tactics, and enlightened
views on living together in an interdependent world. In its proscriptive
capacity, the law prohibited Hussein from both the traditional war crimes
and eco-terrorism. As for establishing process, the law should be implemented as a deterrent, not only for Saddam Hussein, but for other tyrants as well.
Finally, consider again that the failure to try Saddam Hussein may actually be cited in the future as evidence that it is no longer customary
international law procedure to try individuals for planning and waging
aggressive war. When someone openly flaunts accepted standards as Hussein has done, action must be taken to maintain the credibility of the
system. If the legal world fails to act, the rule of law in the international
arena should be subjected to severe, and justifiable, condemnation.
K. Conclusion
The Chinese character for "chaos" has two components. The first component means danger; the second component means opportunity. The
chaos of 1990 and 1991 has presented the world with both danger and
opportunity. It is significant to note that while the collapse of communism reduces the possibility of an all out nuclear war, it actually increases
the probability of regional conflicts.
Rather than wait for a legal system grounded in nineteenth century
thinking to catch up to our twentieth century world, the time is right to
exploit the present opportunities. The dangers confronting the world are
being met head on, and a momentum is under way toward achieving
world order. The people of the world stand ready, anticipating formalization of changes proportional to the hazards many of them have just confronted. The United Nations should seize the opportunity, look forward
to the twenty-first century, and act now to use the rule of law to the
world's advantage. Some ways to improve the "rule of law" that should be
implemented immediately include the following: Having the Security
Council (or a forum created by the Security Council) try Saddam Hussein
for grievous offenses, strengthening the "rule of law" by incorporating
new offenses and allowing the targeting or trial of specific individuals,
and using law as a tool to deter tyrants in all of their activities. The awesome changes of 1991 give rise to new dangers, but more importantly, the
changes provide a unique opportunity to make "rule of law" the primary
cornerstone for a new world order.

